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OPENING REMARKS
1

A. Claudio Grossman

Dear friends, on behalf of the American University Washington College
of Law, good morning and welcome to the MacArthur International
Justice Lecture Series Conference on “Advocacy Before Regional
Human Rights Bodies: A Cross-Regional Agenda.” We are honored
to host this important conference, which will examine a vital subject.
I am sure this joint initiative will contribute significantly to the
strengthening of human dignity.
We receive you today in an institution deeply committed to human
rights and advocacy. Our law school was the first law school in this
country to be founded by women in a moment when women were not
admitted into law schools or into the practice of the profession. Our
founding mothers believed that in order to achieve gender equality,
it was essential that we educate men and women alike within the legal
profession. Their imagination and commitment transformed the
profession and opened possibilities to achieve justice without
discrimination.
1. Claudio Grossman is a Professor of Law and, since 1995, Dean of the
American University Washington College of Law, where he is also the Raymond Geraldson
Scholar for International and Humanitarian Law. Dean Grossman serves as the
Chair of the United Nations Committee against Torture, and as a member of the
Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files. Additionally, he is a member of the
Governing Board of the International Association of Law Schools and Chair of the
Association of American Law Schools Committee on International Cooperation.
Dean Grossman is currently a member of the Board of the College of the Americas,
where he served as President from 2003–2007. He was a member of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights from 1993–2001, where he served in
numerous capacities including two terms as President, two terms as First Vice
President, Second Vice President, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women,
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Populations, and Observer of the
AMIA Trial. Dean Grossman has authored numerous publications regarding
international law and human rights and has received numerous awards for his work
in those fields.
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Following their example, our students, faculty, and administrators
have developed numerous initiatives to promote and protect human
rights. As one example, our Academy on Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law attracts leading scholars and activists in the
universal and regional systems as well as hundreds of students
interested in international law every year.
Another example includes our Center for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law, which has spearheaded major human rights
initiatives to fight injustice. The Center recently launched a new
institute in collaboration with the International Committee of the
Red Cross to train law school professors on the substance and
importance of international humanitarian law and, in particular,
the teaching of the Geneva Conventions.
Our renowned clinical program includes nine in-house clinics in
areas such as international human rights, disability rights, domestic
violence, intellectual property, and community economic
development. Our clinics took the first case in the United States
involving female genital mutilation; by changing the jurisprudence
on this matter to allow such mutilation to be grounds for asylum, the
clinics broadened the scope of the law with respect to this issue. Our
clinics also represent clients in the United States, Africa, and Latin
America, offering pro bono assistance to incorporate international
law into the domestic realm. The Washington College of Law has also
created the United Nations Committee Against Torture Project,
which works to reinforce and strengthen the notion that there is no
justification for torture whatsoever, and that it is essential to comply
with the provisions of the Convention Against Torture in all its
dimensions.
Our Impact Litigation Project, another initiative in the law school,
stresses accountability, freedom of expression, rights of women, and
rights of indigenous populations. Our school also founded the first
war crimes research institution in the United States to support
research and fight impunity for international crimes. Since it was
founded, the institution has understood that accountability is an
essential requirement for the rule of law.
As we develop our numerous programs and activities, we have seen
that we learn as much, or even more than what we contribute. In the
past, law schools would do research, store the products of such
research in libraries, train people, and thereafter claim certain
exclusivity over the particular substantive areas. Now we see
numerous institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
international bodies, and think tanks that engage in similar pursuits,
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thereby diversifying knowledge and its sources. In our strategic
vision, partnering with different actors provides ways to learn from
each other and to multiply our outreach.
In that spirit, we have envisioned this conference as a space for the
exchange of experiences and cross-culture communication between
regional organizations that supervise compliance with human rights
treaties. During this conference, we seek to discuss approaches and
experiences in combating impunity, the scope of reparations,
difficulties and accomplishments in guaranteeing the enforcement of
reparations, and the overall challenges facing regional systems for the
protection of human rights. Although we will be referring to
different treaty-based regional supervisory organs, the fact that a
similar language is used by all three constituent treaties opens up
space for comparisons and identification of good practices. After all,
the narrative of human rights is that of human dignity—that unites us
all.
Before we begin, I would like to take this opportunity to welcome
our distinguished participants, especially those who have come from
afar, and to thank them in advance for sharing their unique insights.
We are joined by participants from Africa, Europe, and the Americas,
each representing different international organizations, law courts,
civil societies, and academic institutions.
Let me thank, above all, the MacArthur Foundation whose support
and commitment made this conference possible. We give special
thanks to Mary Page, Director of the Human Rights and International
Justice Area within the Program on Global Security and
Sustainability.
I would also like to thank the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (“Inter-American Commission”) and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (“Inter-American Court”) for their
co-sponsorship. In spite of their limited resources, both supervisory
organs reach out to civil society through the personal commitment of
their members.
Our special thanks also go to the Inter-American Commission and
Inter-American Court’s secretariat and to Mr. Jose Miguel Insulza,
Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS).
I also want to thank the American University Law Review and its
editors-in-chief, Karen Williams (Volume 58) and David Courchaine
(Volume 59). The Law Review will be publishing the proceedings of
this conference. It bodes well for the legal profession to have
students like those on our Law Review attracted to the legal field. In
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spite of their regular pressures as law students, they have volunteered
to do this important job.
Let me also thank my colleague, Professor Diane Orentlicher,
renowned international law expert. Diane came up with the idea of
this conference and put the law school in touch with the MacArthur
Foundation.
Our gratitude also goes to Agustina Del Campo, the coordinator of
our Impact litigation Project, who helped organize and shape this
event.
It is my pleasure now to introduce Mr. Jonathan Fanton who has
served as the President of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation since 1999. Mr. Fanton oversees one of the nation’s
largest foundations—a foundation which makes grants and runs
programs related to the investment of more than one quarter of a
billion dollars annually and works in more than sixty countries.
Domestically, the Foundation’s programs encompass community
development, housing, juvenile justice, and education with a focus on
digital media and learning. Internationally, the Foundation works in
the fields of human rights and international justice, biodiversity
conservation, population and reproductive health, international
peace and security, as well as migration and human mobility. The
Foundation is also well known for its support of exceptionally creative
individuals through the MacArthur Fellows Program.
In addition to outstanding leadership and management of the
MacArthur Foundation, Mr. Fanton is a board member and former
board chairperson of Human Rights Watch, the largest U.S.-based
human rights organization, which operates in seventy countries. He
is also an advisory trustee of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, a
member of the Board of Trustees of the Chicago History Museum,
the founding Board Chair of the Security Council Report, and CoChair of Chicago’s Partnership for New Communities. Mr. Fanton is
also a distinguished author and editor, having written The University
2
and Civil Society, Volumes I and II, and being co-editor of John Brown:
3
Great Lives Observed and The Manhattan Project: A Documentary
4
Introduction to the Atomic Age.

2. JONATHAN F. FANTON, THE UNIVERSITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY (New School for
Social Research 1995).
3. JOHN BROWN: GREAT LIVES OBSERVED (Richard Warch & Jonathan Fanton
eds., 1973).
4. THE MANHATTAN PROJECT: A DOCUMENTARY INTRODUCTION TO THE ATOMIC
AGE (Michael B. Stoff, Jonathan F. Fanton & R. Hal Williams eds., Temple University
Press 1991).
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We are fortunate to have him at the helm of the MacArthur
Foundation, contributing greatly to the promotion of important
values. Thank you very much.
B. Jonathan Fanton

5

Thank you, Dean Grossman, for those kind words and for
sponsoring this important colloquium. It has been a great pleasure
working with your faculty and staff. They have done a superb job,
and we are really privileged to be here.
There is a little known part of my biography not mentioned, which
is that in the 1990s, I chaired the Middle States Accreditation Review
for American University. So this is a university that I know extremely
well. And I have great respect for all parts of it, but particularly for
the law school that stood out in that accreditation in the 1990s.
This is one of four convocations MacArthur is sponsoring to mark
its 30th anniversary and to remind us that human rights and
international justice have been at the core of MacArthur’s work since
its founding. We began with the first conference at DePaul to assess
the progress and prospects of the International Criminal Court
(ICC). Early next year there will be a symposium at the Yale Law
School on building political will to advance the system of international
justice followed by an event at University of California, Berkeley that will
explore how witnesses and victims participate in international courts
and tribunals.
The Washington College of Law, distinguished by its long
commitment to human rights and international law, is an appropriate
venue for the second convocation in our series. MacArthur is deeply
impressed with the work of this institution, your Center for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law, the International Human Rights Law
Clinic, and the War Crimes Research Office are among many
programs here that advance human rights and international law.
Monitoring and reporting on the international Inter-American
Court, analyzing defense procedures for those indicted by the ICC,
training both scholars and activists in human rights law, and more—
the Washington College of Law has established American University as a
leading venue for research, debate, and action in our quest for an
effective system of international justice.
The contributions of your faculty members are far-reaching: your
Dean, as past president of the Inter-American Commission and now
Chair of the United Nations Committee Against Torture; my friend,
5. President, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
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Herman Schwartz, advising new governments in east and central
Europe on constitutional reform; Robert Goldman, another former
Inter-American Commission President, now serving on the
International Commission of Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism,
Counter-Terrorism, and Human Rights; and Diane Orentlicher,
working with the UN as an independent expert on combating
impunity. I know that is not everybody, but any law school in the
world would be proud of this faculty and its contributions.
Your work resonates profoundly with MacArthur’s aspiration to
advance the rights of all to seek redress when national courts fail to
produce justice. Over the years, MacArthur has supported 600
institutions, working on the frontlines in ninety countries, to expose
abuses and strengthen the rule of law. We have a deep interest in
helping to fashion an integrated system of international justice that
includes the ICC, regional human rights courts and commissions,
and special tribunals impaneled by the UN as well as the UN Human
Rights Council.
MacArthur supported the Coalition for the ICC that helped bring
the ICC into existence more quickly than expected; global rights,
among others, to gather evidence useful in the ICC’s first cases; the
Institute of War and Peace reporting to train local jurists to train local
ICC trials; redress to help engage victims and witnesses; and the
International Bar Association to conduct independent analysis of the
ICC’s proceedings. We hope that stronger accountability will deter
those who would commit mass atrocities but we know there will be
situations that require prompt action to prevent future situations like
the one in Rwanda.
MacArthur was privileged to support the International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which articulated the doctrine
of Responsibility to Protect adopted by the UN in 2005. It affirms
that when states fail to protect, or worse, commit abuses against their
own citizens, the international community has the responsibility to
step in to protect citizens.
The world has a stronger arsenal for justice now than ever before.
While each element had quite separate origins, we are on the cusp of
forging an integrated system of international justice from the
disparate parts—and that is what these convocations are meant to say
and to illustrate.
The age of impunity is about to give way to an age of
accountability. The high profile cases of Slobodan Milosovic,
Radovan Karadzic, Charles Taylor, Augusto Pinochet, Alberto
Fujimori, and Omar Al-Bashir show that leaders can no longer
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commit genocide and crimes against humanity without
consequences. And the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, and Cambodia are trying hundreds of other top-level
perpetrators.
But the story of the regional courts and commissions is just as
impressive, and it needs to be told. Their activity and influence are
on the rise. What we want to do through this colloquium is to
underscore that it is not just the high profile cases that you read
about—it is the everyday work on thousands of cases by the regional
courts and commissions that is helping to build the system of
international justice.
The European Court of Human Rights (“European Court” or
“Strasbourg Court”) in 1989 registered only 400 cases, but last year,
some 40,000 cases were registered. The Inter-American Court, twenty
years younger, has some 150 active cases but the level of applications
is rising: 1500 petitions were received just last year. And the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Court”), which is
only four years old, is preparing to try its first cases. While there is yet
no human rights mechanism on a regional basis in Asia, the recently
adopted ASEAN Charter includes a provision for a human rights
body and talks are now underway on its design. So Europe, InterAmerica, Africa, and eventually Asia are all coming together.
Regional courts and commissions provide ordinary people with the
opportunity to appeal cases of police abuse, discrimination, or
abridgement of free expression and assembly when they have
exhausted remedies within national justice systems. Regional courts
can raise the quality of justice in national courts, and a stronger
culture for the rule of law may well prevent everyday abuses from
aggregating into the worst crimes imaginable.
MacArthur has a deep interest in strengthening these regional
bodies. We have funded NGOs such as Access to Justice in Nigeria,
and the Black Soil Center for the Protection of Media Rights in
Russia to bring precedent-setting cases to these courts and
commissions. We are also interested in helping the regional courts
and commissions directly and will, I hope, early in 2009, announce a
major new initiative aimed at helping the new African Court take
root.
Now, for all of this encouraging news, we know there are
challenges to realizing the full potential of regional and sub-regional
mechanisms—which we should also talk about—and that is the topic
of this conference. How do we make the recommendations of
regional human rights bodies more effective? How do we choose
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cases that will set influential precedents? How do we strengthen the
network of NGOs to build strong cases and bring them forward,
especially in Africa. How do we share experience and expertise most
effectively and strengthen cooperation across regions and countries?
These are the critical questions that our eminent panelists will be
addressing today. You have put together just an extraordinary group
of panelists. They collectively have moved the international justice
system forward to where it is today.
To recognize the contributions of the people in this room and on
these panels and the many others who have labored to build this
system, the MacArthur Foundation last year created an award for
advancing international justice. The award honors an individual or
organization that advances the cause of international justice—it
could be a world leader, a courageous judge, or an ordinary citizen
working through a human rights group. The first recipient was
former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in recognition of his
contribution to building the ICC and encouraging the development
of the responsibility to protect.
We have chosen this venue to announce the second winner of the
MacArthur International Justice Award. We have chosen someone
present at the creation of the modern era of international justice, a
distinguished jurist and legal scholar, a person whose clarity of
purpose, fairness, and credibility is a force that inspires all who labor
in the special tribunals, regional human rights courts, and the ICC
itself. And so it is with great pleasure, great honor, that I announce
that the second recipient of the MacArthur Award for International
Justice will be Richard J. Goldstone.
Justice Goldstone, already a prominent judge, came to
international attention as the Chair of the Commission of Inquiry
regarding public violence and intimidation in the aftermath of
apartheid in his native South Africa. His wise and even-handed
direction of the Commission proved invaluable to the democratic
transition in that country where he also served as an inaugural
member of the Constitutional Court.
In 1994, Justice Goldstone was appointed Chief Prosecutor of the
UN International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
for Rwanda, the first of their kind since Nuremberg. His mature,
meticulous, and measured exercise of that mandate reanimated the
enterprise of international justice, bringing both a degree of
resolution to victims and a new model for the prosecution of crimes
against humanity.
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Insisting on the independence of the counsel and judges, a
transparent establishment of the facts in each case, due process
protections for the accused, and the centrality of first-hand testimony
from witnesses and surviving victims, Judge Goldstone gave the
tribunals moral authority and legal credibility. It is a testament to the
quality of his work that the international community accepted the
Rome Statute and established the ICC with confidence. Justice
Goldstone stood guarantor for the responsibility, probity, and value
of international justice: his unquestioned competence and integrity
won the faith of the world. At the close of his recent memoir, For
Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Investigator, Justice Goldstone
had these words:
No longer will dictators or oppressive governments be able to
violate the fundamental rights of citizens with impunity. We
are moving into a new and different world. I have no doubt
that the 21st Century will witness the growth of an
International Criminal Justice System and that the victims of
6
war crimes will no longer be ignored.
Sharing that goal, and in tribute to all Richard Goldstone has
accomplished, the MacArthur Foundation is indeed privileged to
name him the second recipient of our award which will be conferred,
appropriately, in the Hague in May 2009.
So, in closing, I want to thank all of you for your kind attention. I
want to applaud your efforts to ensure that all members of the
human family are treated with fairness and respect. We look forward
to making common cause with you in pursuit of a more just, humane,
and peaceful world. Have a great conference.
I.

PANEL 1: PERSPECTIVES, APPROACHES, AND EXPERIENCES IN
COMBATING IMPUNITY
A. Diane Orentlicher

7

Along with Claudio, I would like to begin by thanking the
MacArthur Foundation for supporting this colloquium.
The
MacArthur Foundation has long been one of the crucial supporters
of the institutions that ensure meaningful protection of human rights
in difficult circumstances around the globe as well as individuals who
have been in the forefront and in the frontlines and trenches in
6. RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES
INVESTIGATOR 138 (2000).
7. Co-director, Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, American
University, Washington College of Law, and Professor of International Law.
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defending human rights against incredible challenges. Under the
leadership of Jonathan Fanton, the Foundation has very often been
the wind behind the sails of those who are indeed facing these
challenges and working to defend human rights around the world,
and to strengthen the institutions that we are going to be talking
about today, that help ensure protection in a systemic way.
I also want to thank Mary Page of the MacArthur Foundation for
being a friend and for allowing us to tap her wisdom as we planned
this session, as well as Agustina and Jennifer from the Washington
College of Law, who have really knocked themselves out to pull this
together. And finally, I want to thank the Inter-American Court and
Commission for co-hosting this event.
Turning to the subject of this panel, the Inter-American human
rights bodies have been leaders in the subject matter of this panel,
that is, in developing both legal tools and institutional mechanisms to
combat impunity.
The law and institutions of human rights
developed to combat impunity are truly global and increasingly
interrelated, even as they continue to operate in largely separate and
distinct spheres.
I have had a number of occasions to be impressed by the interconnectedness of these institutions and developments. Let me
mention just one, however, that brought home to me how important
it is to foster a cross-regional dialogue among institutions committed
to promoting human rights. Several years ago, the Secretary-General
of the UN asked me to undertake a study assessing recent
developments globally in combating impunity. As my research
progressed, I was struck to see how much, when one institution—
such as the Inter-American Court, the UN Commission on Human
Rights, or the UN Human Rights Committee—took the lead in
establishing a new benchmark of protection for human rights, their
decisions tended to have an inspirational effect across regions and
across institutions. For example, when one treaty body adopted a
decision declaring amnesties impermissible to the extent that they
cover atrocious crimes, other human rights bodies were inspired to
be more courageous than they otherwise might have been in
establishing similar protections in their own case law.
Significantly too, I was struck by the fact that it was not just that
regional human rights bodies and international bodies, like the UN
Human Rights Committee, that were following each other’s lead in
interpreting key human rights treaties—there has also been a new
synergy between these human rights bodies and international
criminal tribunals, which have been an important feature of the
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international landscape in combating impunity for the past fifteen
years since the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), followed by several other tribunals
including a permanent international criminal court.
To offer one example, ten years ago the ICTY explicitly recognized
something we had all thought to be the case—that rape is a form of
torture. In support of its conclusion, it cited an important decision
several years earlier from the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights recognizing that rape is a form of torture, as well as an
important decision from the European Court—decided one year
before the ICTY’s judgment—similarly recognizing that rape is a
form of torture. And so we do, as Jonathan Fanton said, have an
increasingly interconnected architecture of protection, and the
disparate parts influence each other in important ways. Major
breakthroughs in one system have often resounded across the system
of disparate bodies.
In today’s panel we are going to look at some of the achievements
in one particular and especially important area of protection:
responses of human rights bodies to the challenge of impunity.
The first speaker this morning is Felipe González, a member of the
Inter-American Commission. He also serves as Rapporteur on
Migrant Workers and their Families and as a full-time professor of
constitutional law at Diego Portales University.
B. Felipe González

8

Thank you very much Diane, and thank you for the invitation to
participate at this conference. I will try to do my best to speak in the
ten minutes assigned to me. I will speak mostly about the evolution
of the treatment of gross violations of human rights in the InterAmerican system and discuss its influence on other systems.
Over the last fifteen or twenty years there has been a dramatic
evolution in the international approach to gross human rights
violations and confrontation with these violations. This is a dynamic
process in changing contexts. While he was in office, former
President Aylwin of Chile pointed out that what had to be achieved
was as much justice as possible. But in fact, what has happened is that
what has become possible has notably expanded, not only in Chile,
but in many other countries, in part or to a larger extent as a result of
developments in international law.
8. Felipe González is a Commissioner at the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission. He is also a Professor of International Law and Constitutional Law at
Diego Portales University, Santiago de Chile.

2009] ADVOCACY BEFORE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES

175

In a nutshell, what changed? The situation used to be that the
confrontation of these violations was subordinated to politics. Take
Spain, for instance, which in 1977 issued a broad amnesty law. The
international community did not complain at all about it. The same
happened with respect to many countries at that time. It was a
situation where the demands of the victims were mostly perceived by
society as testimonial in character, without a strong legal basis.
Therefore, at the best, their demands would be partially considered
to be balanced with the political constraints, including the demands
from the perpetrators themselves, who were usually part of or
otherwise linked in some ways to the armed forces. In that context in
the mid-1980s, the Inter-American Commission made a distinction
between those amnesty laws for gross violations issued by
dictatorships—such was the case of Chile for instance—and those
that were the result of democratic decisions.
The former, the Inter-American Commission said at that time in
the mid-80s, were incompatible with international standards. The
latter, the Commission said, was a matter for domestic decision. But
over the last fifteen years, the situation experienced a significant
change. The confrontation of gross violations is not seen any longer
at the discretion of governments, but something that is required by
international law.
And in this regard, the Inter-American
Commission itself and the Inter-American Court have played a very
important role. So, since the late 1980s, jurisprudence from the
Inter-American Court and Commission started to address this issue,
sometimes in an explicit manner and sometimes in an implicit
manner, in a broader perspective.
This started with the judgment of the Inter-American Court in the
9
late 1980s in Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras in which the Court stated
that it was a duty for the state to fully guarantee the protection of
human rights and that this included the investigation—full
investigation—of human rights crimes, prosecution of prosecutors,
and sanctioning the perpetrators. The case however, did not address
explicitly an amnesty law as such. This kind of case, instead, came to
the Inter-American Commission in the early 1990s and that showed a
dramatic change in the jurisprudence of the Commission compared
to the decision in the mid 1980s that I just spoke about. These were
the cases regarding Argentina and Uruguay, and their respective
amnesty laws. The Commission found that those amnesties while
enacted by democratic regimes in Argentina and Uruguay, were
9. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988).
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nonetheless contrary to the American Convention on Human Rights
(“American Convention”).
At that time, I remember I was living here in Washington, D.C.,
and there were very strong reactions, not only from the Uruguayan
and Argentinean governments at the time, but also from many other
countries. That the Inter-American Commission interpreted the
American Convention in this way seemed like something new.
However, over time, and during the 1990s, this started to be a very
significant development at the Inter-American system.
In fact, I remember that when the Inter-American Commission
issued these decisions in 1992, Louis Joinet, who was the UN expert
in charge of the topic of impunity, circulated some drafts regarding
this matter. Those drafts—one from 1993, for instance—were much
softer in their approach than the Commission’s approach at the time.
In that draft that was publicly circulated by Mr. Joinet, it was not said
in a peremptory way that states should always prosecute and sanction
the victims. However, over time, you can see how that approach
evolved, and in its final report in 1997, Mr. Joinet basically agreed
with the position of the Commission on the interpretation of
international law. Later on, the Commission issued several decisions
in 1996 and 1998 about the amnesty law in Chile, which were not
hard cases because it was a self-amnesty by the dictatorship, unlike
those amnesties from Argentina and Uruguay.
In the current decade, the Inter-American Court addressed the
10
issue in several cases. These cases include Barrios Altos v. Perú,
concerning two amnesty laws issued by the Fujimori regime in Peru;
11
Goiburú v. Paraguay, where there was not an amnesty law, but in
some cases a lack of a thorough investigation that the Court said was
required according to international standards; and Almonacid-Arellano
12
v. Chile against Chile, in which the Court developed the doctrine
that the crimes against humanity had to be fully prosecuted and
sanctioned by states.
This evolution has made clear that according to the American
Convention on Human Rights, there is a state duty to investigate
gross violations and to prosecute and sanction the perpetrators. This
evolution does not mean that in practice today states are
automatically following these standards. They have followed them to
different extents. However, the crucial difference is that today the
issue of confronting the past is at the center of any process of
10. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001).
11. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153 (Sept. 22, 2006).
12. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 (Sept. 26, 2006).
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transition from an internal armed conflict to democracy. This was
not the case fifteen or twenty years ago. It is not any more an issue
that can simply be avoided by governments invoking political
constraints.
In the end, this solution has also, as a consequence, significantly
enhanced the position of the victims and their relatives, making
stronger their demands. I said at the beginning of my presentation
that fifteen or twenty years ago, the victims did not have such a strong
legal basis in international law, and most of their demands were seen
as testimonial in nature. Now that is not the case. It is a significant
step forward for the protection of their rights. Thank you very much.
******
Diane Orentlicher: Thank you so much for that wonderfully lucid
overview of the evolution of the work of the Inter-American system in
combating impunity. Felipe ended by talking about how this
jurisprudence, which initially came like a bolt out of the blue for
leaders in Latin America, began to take root over time, and gradually
expectations regarding how states would confront a legacy of abuse
has begun to change. This provides a nice foundation for other
panelists’ remarks, as one of the points I am sure we will address in
this panel is how those judgments eventually took root against
resistance and addressed challenges in implementation.
I would like to call on Judge Leonardo Franco next. Judge Franco
is an extraordinarily distinguished member of the Inter-American
Court. He has had a distinguished record of service in numerous
capacities, including at high levels of government in Argentina and as
Special Rapporteur for Human Rights for Sudan on behalf of the
Commission of Human Rights at the UN. I would like to welcome
Judge Franco.
C. Leonardo Franco

13

Thank you. First of all, I would like to say that it is with great
satisfaction and pride that I participate in this important panel at this
University, a University that has contributed so much to the
development of international human rights law and humanitarian
law in Latin America. Today’s topic—how to deal with the past—has

13. Judge, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Organization of American
States. The views expressed are those of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Commission or the OAS.

178

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:163

great significance, and is central to the transition of totalitarian
regimes to democratic systems.
In many cases, our pasts are laden with systematic violations.
Impunity is really a system, one that has been built up through
regulations and practices. It will take time and much effort to
dismantle such a system. It is also being fought through legal
reforms, but more importantly, through the human rights
movements taking place in academic and political circles. This
dynamic process has taken place in Argentina, among other places,
and I would like to refer to the specific ways in which Argentina was
able to come to terms with its burdensome past.
Before its withdrawal, the military left a law of impunity as a parting
gift, which is a common practice among totalitarian governments.
This law of impunity was relatively easy to abolish by the newly
established administration headed by Mr. Alfonsín, who was elected
president on a human rights agenda.
Shortly after, the Government focused on the task of prosecuting
the military commanders who had directed the military process of
repression. Five high ranking military generals were given long
prison terms and four were acquitted. We thought that this would be
the end of the problem, but we were wrong.
A period of intense pressure then followed, as it usually does,
which threatened the stability of the democratic system.
Consequently, the system was compelled—and this created much
controversy—to adopt measures that strengthened impunity. For
example, two laws, the Law of Due Obedience and the “Punto Final”
Law, severely limited the investigation of other actions perpetrated
against other people.
Moreover, with the change of administration and after Dr. Menem
was installed as constitutional President, there was also a need to take
other measures, which were pardon laws, or pardons for individual
cases. Argentina was therefore caught in a vise, and there was a huge
reaction against these measures, both from the domestic and
international communities. Fortunately, the Inter-American system
played an important role in ensuring Argentina’s transition towards
the rule of law through which the responsibility of those who
committed violations could be examined.
This process was facilitated by a judgment by the Argentina
Supreme Court in the 1990s, which established that the status of
international human rights treaties was similar to the status of the
Constitution. This judgment was later strengthened by the 1994
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constitutional reform which placed human rights treaties in first
place.
In the mean time, the Argentina Supreme Court issued decisions
that established the constitutionality of measures of impunity
adopted by previous administrations. These decisions were criticized,
as Felipe had just mentioned, by the Inter-American Commission.
The Commission’s criticisms had nothing to do with Argentina, but
instead had to do with a neighboring country, Peru, which provided
the legal basis for an in-depth analysis of the self-amnesty measures
14
that Argentina had adopted. This was the case of Barrios Altos, which
Felipe has also mentioned, and which is considered fundamental visà-vis those measures through which a regime declares itself to be
unaccountable.
I would like to comment on the amnesty laws. There was a period
during which amnesty laws were viewed as a positive aspect of human
rights. I remember that in my work with refugees in the 1970s in
various parts of the world—Africa, Latin America—governments and
states were asked to grant amnesty in order to allow for the safe
return of refugees. In Brazil there was a huge movement in the 1970s
in favor of amnesty. But this was amnesty that the victims requested
from the authorities. The amnesty laws that we are referring to now
are measures passed by the same governments, the same authorities
that systematically violated human rights.
In Barrios Altos, the Inter-American Court held that whenever
irrevocable rights (recognized as such by international human rights
law) are violated, all amnesty provisions, provisions on statutory
limitations, and measures designed to eliminate responsibility are
15
inadmissible.
This is because they are intended to prevent the
investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human
rights violations including: torture; extrajudicial, summary, or
arbitrary execution; and enforced disappearances. These actions are
prohibited because they violate fundamental rights recognized by
international human rights law. Moreover, an interpretive judgment
by the same Court held that the Barrios Altos decision had general
16
application; it went beyond that particular case.
Most importantly, Argentina, which was not directly linked to the
judgment, was receptive to the Inter-American Court’s case law. In

14. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001).
15. Id.
16. Case of Barrios Altos (Interpretive Judgment), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 83 (Sept. 3, 2001).
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Simón, an extremely important case, the Argentina Supreme Court
stated that the Laws of Due Obedience and “Punto Final” were null
18
and void. In this way, the period in Argentine history characterized
by the lack of search for the truth and the lack of accountability of
the perpetrators of violations finally came to an end.
This made possible the indictment of many others. Very recently,
two military generals—the governor of Tucumán and the chief
commander of the military—notoriously involved in the repression in
Argentina were given life terms, and the Barrios Altos case was cited.
I would like to comment briefly on four concepts articulated in the
Simón case, which concerns us all. First, the standard established by
the Inter-American Court in the case of Barrios Altos “cannot be
satisfied, and it would be insufficient to repeal the Due Obedience
and Punto Final Laws if at the same time measures were not taken to
19
make it impossible to invoke the most lenient penal law.” Second,
“if the decisions of the international tribunal are interpreted in good
faith as legal precedent, it is imperative that the findings of the InterAmerican Court in the case of Barrios Altos apply to the case of
20
Argentina.” Third, international treaties on human rights should be
interpreted according to international law. In other words, they
should not be interpreted according to national law, but according to
international law. Lastly, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American
Court and the directives of the Commission constitute essential
guides for the interpretation of the duties and obligations emanating
from the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights. In other
words, national judges must also interpret and apply the InterAmerican Convention.
Previously, there was another case that I will refer to briefly, the
21
Arancibia Clavel case. This was a case that involved (repressive)
actions against Chilean activists; there was a web of informants that
22
provided information on persons persecuted in Buenos Aires. This
case, in which Arancibia Clavel was indicted, is considered a leading
case on the subject, because not only did it mean the recognition but
also the application of this principle to those actions that occurred
17. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, “Simón, Julio Héctor y otros,”
Collección Officiál de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de la Nación [Fallos] (2005-3282056) (Arg.).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 24/8/2004, “Arancibia Clavel, Enrique
Lautaro y otros,” Collección Officiál de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de la Nación
[Fallos] (2004-327-3294) (Arg.).
22. Id.
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before the ratification of the Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
throughout Argentina.
Finally, a brief reference to a previous case in which the InterAmerican Court addressed the topic of pardons, which was the key
element needed to put an end to impunity. The Court in this case,
also invoking the Barrios Altos decision, held that the pardons were
measures that breached the Inter-American Convention of Human
Rights. However, I should also note that this opened up a new
controversy, because two judges in the minority dissented,
maintaining that it affected constitutional rights such as res judicata.
Which means that this is not the end of the story.
Thank you.
D. Discussion
Diane Orentlicher: Thank you so much. I want to underscore one of
the points that came out of Judge Franco’s remarks because it is so
terribly important. In countries where really notable advances have
been made in confronting amnesty laws and other obstacles to
accountability, the legal status of international treaties and domestic
law often seems to be critical. An important example is highlighted
in Judge Franco’s remarks about Argentina, where the constitutional
status of human rights treaties made a big difference. So perhaps, as
we start to accumulate “lessons learned,” we may want to work into
our agenda the importance of working to enhance the domestic
status of human rights treaties.
I think we have a few minutes for questions. Let me first begin,
though, by asking our panelists if any of them either wants to ask a
question of another panelist or has further comments that he or she
would like to make.
******
Felipe González: I would like to add a point about the reciprocal
influences of the Inter-American system or the UN system regarding
impunity, which I just briefly mentioned before. Because, in fact, in
the recent decisions by the Inter-American Commission and Court
regarding amnesty laws, or—more generally—impunity, they rely a
lot on the developments of the ICC and the International Criminal
Courts for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. So there is a strong
link between the jurisprudence of the Inter-American system and that
of these UN established tribunals.
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In addition, on the issue of forced disappearance of persons, there
was strong feedback on that matter. For instance, there was a famous
visit of the Inter-American Commission to Argentina in 1979 where
the Commission discovered the clandestine prisoners who were about
to be disappeared and killed at some point. That prompted the UN
to establish a working group on this matter. And later, the
Commission, in the mid to late 1980s, drafted a project for an Inter23
American Convention on Forced Disappearances that prompted the
UN to move forward toward a UN declaration on this matter.
In the end, the UN declaration was adopted before the InterAmerican Convention, so it was really a feedback on that matter. In
the end, the developments of the Inter-American system led also to
the adoption of UN Convention of Forced Disappearances at the
24
UN. These are only a few examples of this feedback among the
systems.
******
Diane Orentlicher: One question that I wanted to ask is prompted in
part by Felipe’s last observation. I would be interested in hearing
your thoughts on how the ICC might complement the work of the
Inter-American human rights system in situations where both systems
are involved in a particular country. There are a number of ways
where questions might arise or where there might be helpful
synergies in terms of questions arising.
For instance, when the ICC is looking at the situation in Colombia
at a time when the Inter-American Commission and Court are also
looking at it, does the ICC step aside and wait until the case has
worked its way through the Inter-American system in the hope that
there may be an effective remedy or an increasingly effective
response to the decisions of the Inter-American body? Or is that an
inappropriate approach? Should there be synergies? Also, if anybody
wants to address this question, perhaps there are other ways the ICC,
in addition to those Felipe mentioned, might benefit from the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American system, and other systems as
well, in applying its complementarity analysis. For example, would
the ICC find something useful in the analysis of these bodies about
whether domestic systems have satisfied the exhaustion requirement
23. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearance of Persons, June 9, 1994, 33 ILM 1529.
24. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, G.A. Res. 61/177, 20 Dec. 2006, A/Res/61/177; 14 IHRR 582
(2007).
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or provided an adequate remedy domestically when it considers
whether its own complementarity standard has been satisfied?
I ask these questions in part because of the experience that Felipe
and a few others have noted where human rights bodies were at risk
of going wobbly on certain issues. These bodies were made aware of
the fact that other bodies, other experts, and other human rights
mechanisms were looking at the same issue and perhaps about to
come out with an opinion that was more progressive than the one
they were thinking of adopting. This inspired perhaps greater
courage and boldness that we might not otherwise have seen from
the bodies that were looking to see what their neighbors were doing.
So with that in mind, is that a dynamic that can be exploited in the
African system, now that we see a dynamic of increasing options?
******
Leonardo Franco: With regard to the question of the competence of
the ICC, allow me to make reference to the more general question of
the relationship between human rights and humanitarian law. It is
an important question for the Court since, quite often, situations that
lead to petitions before the Court via the Commission in fact are
related to humanitarian problems. The question then turns into the
role of the Court in those cases.
The Inter-American Court, as an organ of supervision of the
Convention and other Inter-American treaties, has not declared
violations of international humanitarian law treaties, strictu sensu
speaking. This was particularly established in the case of Las Palmeras
25
v. Colombia, in which the Inter-American Commission requested that
the Tribunal declare the violation of the right to life as recognized
under Article 4 of the Convention and Article 3 common of the
Geneva Conventions. The ICC decided that the Inter-American
system organs cannot declare such violations, as they had no
competence to do it. However, and this is the most important
feature, the Tribunal established that relevant provisions of the
Geneva treaties may be taken into account as criteria of
interpretation of the Convention. This idea has since been reiterated
in several cases. So the Court has served itself of International
Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) in order to analyze and conceptualize the
state obligations to protect and guarantee the exercise of several
rights.

25. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 96 (Nov. 26, 2002).
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The Court has observed the existence of general and special state
obligations to protect civilian populations and vulnerable groups—
internally displaced persons, children, etc.—in situations of internal
or international armed conflict, as well as in cases related to the use
of force and suspension of guarantees, regarding internal violence
and conflicts, states of emergency, actions against terrorism, social
protest, and other exceptional situations, even in times of peace. The
Court recognized certain non-derogable provisions in such cases.
The Court has even considered IHL provisions when it has ordered
provisional measures of protection of certain communities in armed
conflict situation, and when it has directed the states to adapt
domestic law to IHL or to conduct programs of education in IHL for
their public servants.
All those cases show that, nowadays, we see a convergence and
complementarity between international law of human rights and
international humanitarian law. Therefore, the two value systems
coexist. How can the coexistence of these systems lead to justice?
The two systems are necessary, fundamental, and a very good road to
peace-building. The question that has been posed in the past and the
present, in Latin America as well as in Africa—let me remind you of
Sudan—is the relation between the search for peace and the
promotion and protection of human rights violations committed in
the past. Perhaps in Central America, there are many cases of the
two objectives complementing each other. In my experience
regarding Sudan, where it was very difficult—not with Sudanese
people but with the UN in New York—the answer was, “First we will
have peace; then we will see.” I think this solution does not help.
Those processes are necessarily complementary and simultaneous.
******
Felipe González: Regarding the first question that Diane posed, I
think that the role of the ICC and the role of the Inter-American
system are fully complementary. The nature of these bodies is
completely different, so they complement each other. The very name
of the ICC says it is a criminal tribunal, which is not the case for the
Inter-American Court or the Commission, which is a semi-judicial
body and only establishes the responsibilities that states may have in
some situations.
In addition to that, I would say that, in addition to the work on the
specific cases, the Inter-American Commission has a broad mandate
which includes the possibility of preparing reports—country reports,
thematic reports—based on in-country visits. So that is also a role
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different from that of the ICC. And as for the options, I think it is a
difference as well because there is no way for a citizen as such to go to
the ICC, but instead they can go to the Commission directly.
******
Andrew Drzemczewski: I have a question to the panelists on the issue
of “impunity.” Reference has been made to “state responsibility” for
impunity. But what is the responsibility of international actors in this
respect? Permit me to explain. The European Court refused to deal
with cases brought by individual applicants against states’ parties to
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in a situation
where—within the scope of military action—member states of NATO
and the UN had allegedly committed serious human rights violations
26
27
(Bankovic v. Belgium, Behrami v. France cases). This meant that the
individuals were, in effect, prevented from arguing the merits of their
claims before the Strasbourg Court. Does this not suggest that, when
major human rights violations have allegedly been committed by
international actors—say, in a hypothetical case, by KFOR or UNMIK
in Kosovo—the said actors cannot be held responsible for their
action before an international human rights body? This concerns the
issue of impunity/immunity of international actors who may
circumvent responsibility for human rights violations. Should not the
reasoning developed with respect to state responsibility—concerning
the eradication of impunity—not be extended to that of international
organizations and actors?
And I ask this question accidentally-on-purpose, knowing that one
of the persons on the panel is preparing a report on “impunity” for
the UN right now. Thank you.
******
Diane Orentlicher: I have just one comment. I believe that there was
a decision about a month or so ago in the Netherlands in which a
court concluded that members of the Dutch battalion at Srebrenica
could not be prosecuted at all, whether or not a prosecution would
lead to a conviction. The court ruled that as soldiers serving under
the UN banner, members of the Dutch battalion enjoyed the
immunity conferred on them under the applicable status of forces
agreement or other UN principles of immunity. So either way, they

26. 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333.
27. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 85 (2007).
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were immune, but both doctrines pointed to some other theory in
which they could be held accountable.
And so perhaps I can react by drawing on a point made earlier
about how we begin to tackle situations where the challenge of
impunity is so great it is hard to even find your way in. There does
seem to be now growing publicity and public concern about this
practice which, as you have noted, has prompted the UN itself to
study the problem and try to find a handle on it. Perhaps that is the
first stage toward finding a more effective way to crack the impunity
that leads to serious abuses by UN forces and others, which is a
horrible shame that has to be addressed.
I want to close with two related conclusions that emerged from this
panel, which are perhaps a foundation for further development of
work in this area.
First, a point that was forcefully brought home by this panel is that
these battles against impunity take a long time. Something that I
thought was quite heartening from the presentations by those
involved in the Inter-American system is to see the progress over
decades since the disheartening situation in which the positive
decisions by the Inter-American Commission, as Felipe noted at the
start of this panel, seemed at the time to be just words, and people
thought that they were not going to take root. Then we heard from
other speakers about the Argentine courts, where the Argentina
Supreme Court has used the case law of the Inter-American system,
including a case involving another country, not Argentina itself, to
annul amnesties with retroactive effect. This shows an enormous
amount of progress. So the struggle against impunity is one that will
take a long time, and it is an ongoing challenge. Even when you
think you have won some victories, you have to take the struggle to
the next step.
This brings me to a final observation relating to perhaps the
foundation for renewed efforts in various arenas. I was also struck by
the profound importance of domesticating the victories one achieves
before regional human rights bodies. I think this point leads us to
the subject of the next panel: When you win a victory in one of these
regional or international courts, it by no means translates
automatically into effective action at the national level. Concerted
efforts are needed to do that.
One of the significant lessons learned is that if treaties have
constitutional status, or somehow in domestic law are more readily
translated into effective incorporation, it makes a big difference to
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their enforcement by domestic courts. Related to that point, there
has been an enormous amount of sharing of jurisprudence across
regional and international bodies, which has had a really important
influence in advancing the jurisprudence of these bodies. But those
of us who work in this area recognize that in many ways a lot of the
key action is now occurring in the national courts. And again, to cite
examples from this panel, the decisions of the Argentine courts,
some decisions of the courts in Colombia, and those of other national
courts have been really important precedents that have inspired
countries in other areas, other regions, as well as in neighboring
countries, to do better than they might otherwise have done. But we
have more of a language barrier in sharing that jurisprudence than
we have in sharing jurisprudence among human rights treaty bodies,
and I am aware of some efforts to try to overcome this.
I do not want to extend this any longer because we are already well
over time, but I do want to thank an extraordinary panel for bringing
rich insights and expertise to this discussion. Thank you.
II. PANEL 2: THE SCOPE OF REPARATIONS: CHALLENGES
IN DEFINING THEIR SCOPE AND GUARANTEEING THEIR ENFORCEMENT
Claudio Grossman: First of all, I want to welcome the panelists and
thank them for their presence. They are a unique body of scholars
and experts, and we look forward to an exchange of views on the
three different systems. We have agreed that we are going to first
discuss the Inter-American system, then the African system, and,
finally, the European system.
A. Sergio García Ramírez

28

Ten minutes is not a lot of time for such a big issue. But I want to
take a few minutes to say thank you for the generous invitation by the
Washington College of Law, the Dean, who is my friend, and those who
made this discussion possible. The topic of my brief speech and the
topic of the panel is reparations—which is certainly a fundamental
and crucial issue. Obviously, if there are no reparations as a
consequence of illicit conduct, there is no judicial security, no justice;
and impunity will prevail. Also, demonstrating the lack and inefficacy
of reparations will push the protection of rights in general into a
28. Judge, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Organization of American
States. The views expressed are those of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Commission or the OAS.
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crisis. It is worth noting that the lack of penal prosecution is not the
only form of impunity. We often say that impunity occurs when the
individual who committed the crime is not sanctioned. But impunity
can also come in the form of avoiding an order for reparations,
causing reparations to become an illusory remedy.
The enormous burden and enormous importance of reparations as
a way to restore rights—the objective of judicial order—is to create
conditions that allow for the creation and development of human
relations, and to compensate the victim for the violation he suffered.
Reparations are the natural expectation of the victim, the natural
expectation of society, and the natural expectation of the state
because they involve not only a judicial duty, but also an ethical and
political duty.
In the case of the Inter-American system, we need to study the core
questions of reparations in order to understand fully the trebled
expectation and the trebled context. First, we should study the
international development of reparations and how reparations
developed in the Inter-American system vis-à-vis this international
development. Although the Inter-American system is based on
European examples, the American result is certainly different from
the European result. Second, we should study the application of the
system of reparations and the reality of how it operates—particularly
given the circumstances and conditions of the Latin American
political, historical, and cultural context. And, lastly, we should focus
on the formation of the rule. I believe this element is very important
because it follows the path of the rule from the past to the present
and into the future. We should study the famous brief precursor to
Article 63 of the American Convention from before, during, and after
the conference that gave rise to the American Convention. This tiny
fertile precursor, born in the first version of Article 63, was closely
tied to the European system. It looked very much toward Europe in
its development, but it finally reached a conclusion of its own on a
different path from the European system of reparations. I am not
saying it is worse; I am not saying it is better; I am saying that it is
simply different.
When the San Jose Conference arrived, projects were presented to
the Inter-American Commission such as the project of judicialconsulting and the Chile-Uruguay project involving a version of a
reparations system very similar to that of the European Convention of
1950 (“European Convention”).
The proposed Chile-Uruguay
reparations system was more or less a profoundly modified version of
the text of the European Convention. The Guatemalan proposal at
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the Conference introduced the language that would later become
Article 63. Article 63 laid out the framework for compensation as
well as actual and future guarantees of reparations. For this reason,
in my work, I refer to the broad horizon of the Inter-American
system, while the European system is narrower. The European system
puts its trust in national laws. When the European Court verifies the
existence or lack of a violation, it refers the case back to the national
system, unless the national system cannot fully repair the
consequences of the violation. In contrast, the Inter-American
system, for various reasons, did not trust the national systems. The
Inter-American system put more trust in the international system and
gave the Inter-American Court the opportunity, necessity, and
mandate to dictate the reparations rather than merely referring the
issue back to national jurisdictions. That is how the Court has
worked. There are only a handful of cases—which could be
summarized on the fingers of two hands—that the Court has referred
back to national jurisdictions, sometimes with good results and
sometimes with results that were not as good.
I would highlight the following fact: the Inter-American Court’s
interpretation of the reparations system was created in a short
amount of time. The Court has been around for less than three
decades, and the number of decisions it has issued has been relatively
small. I am not saying that the number of decisions has been
insufficient; rather, I am saying they have been relatively limited. The
Court arrived at decisions in a very short amount of time from the
date of its inception, and the Court always decided cases within its
authority but without a pro-person, pro hominem slant. The Court
decided cases without allowing imagination to run too wild, but at the
same time opening up possibilities of interpretation in order to avoid
the complete immobility of the rules. With an awareness—which I
would consider reasonable—of the circumstances of the InterAmerican system, decisions were made with a strong emphasis on the
source of the violation, the individual act, the concrete individual, the
agent or the state, and on the law. The decision, or the process of
arriving at the decision, allowed for an attack on the violation by way
of its source. As a result, the reparation generally has a reach that
goes much further than you would expect if you were to restrict the
case to the particular victim.
This approach lends itself to
consistency, or an aspiration of idealism and consistency. I am not
trying to say, however, that this will always be the scope of the
reparations ordered by the Court, which are varied and involve quite
creative jurisprudence.
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This leads me to another characteristic of the Inter-American
system as a whole—the renovation of the Inter-American system
through a decisive turn, which occurred in the third decision issued
by the Inter-American Court. This decision spoke to compensation
and reparation, and it opened up the space to move forward toward
reparations in general. Of course there have been many obstacles in
the path of moving towards a system of reparations: reticence, or
political or judicial resistance (which is political at its root), such as
high costs, problems of proof, complexities, and delays. In the face
of these obstacles, the Court modified its regulations and, above all,
its policies to better impart justice. The Court’s ability of “selfcompensation” also played an important role with regard to
reparations, because it allowed for alternative solutions or results to
the traditional remedies. Compensation is malleable, and the
foundation of reparations is also malleable to a certain point, but
only to the point permissible in each situation. But it is a guarantee
for the system and for the people to never remove knowledge of the
case—what is going on and what should occur—from the InterAmerican community, which is aware and alert.
In addition to emphasizing compensation for damages, I would
like to note that there are at least thirty varieties of different
reparations that the Inter-American Court can order.
These
reparations are perfectly reasonable given Articles 1.1, 2, and 73.1,
which require or order states to fulfill obligations that are unfulfilled.
By failing to do so, states are also in violation of the Convention,
which also requires further reparations. These varieties and other
disciplinary actions or instruments of reparations are those that make
up the doctrine of reparations of the Court. Generally, states, which
are sometimes bellicose with regard to the amount of compensation
required, have peacefully accepted the general idea, nature, and
existence of reparations over the last thirty years.
The Inter-American Court can directly mandate constitutional
modifications, and although they are not directly enforced,
reparations are available for the Court to impose. The Court can
even impose housing programs, relocation programs for the
displaced, education and health projects, revision of trial processes,
suppression, and more. In other words, this has been the most
constructive and most realistic aspect of the Court. I consider it the
most realistic because, step–by–step, the Court’s policies have soaked
through to the underlying national systems and policies.
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I am very honored to be here with you this morning. I want to
thank Claudio Grossman for having me here today. In a decision
that was issued a few years ago in the case of Caesar v. Trinidad and
30
Tobago, one of the Court’s findings stated that Article 75 of the
American Convention has a gap. The gap arose because, although
the Court is required to inform the General Assembly of the OAS of
non-compliance with decisions, there was no institutional process
established within the same organization to do so. It has been
established that the General Assembly, the highest political body in
the organization, does not deal with or consider non-compliance of
decisions issued by the Court. Do you believe that it is right, given
the level of evolution that the Inter-American system has achieved,
that when the Court informs the General Assembly of the OAS of
non-compliance, the General Assembly’s resolution does not
mention such non-compliance? Is this right, considering that Article
68 of the American Convention stipulates that states that are parties
to a case have the obligation to comply with the decisions? Do you
believe that it is right that no mention is made of the Court’s report
identifying that a specific state did not comply with the decision of
the Tribunal? And there is no debate about this?
This is the main issue that will, at some point, have to be addressed
in the OAS because there is an entire process that has brought us to
this point. The first stage of the process was no more than issuing the
first decisions by the Inter-American Court. One example is the case
against Honduras for forced disappearances in which there was a
devaluation of the Honduran currency at the moment the decision
and the resulting reparations and compensatory damages were
announced. Honduras alleged that they were to pay in their
domestic currency, and the victims wanted their award revalued.
Consequently, they asked for an interpretation of the decision, and
Honduras complied a few years later. But in the meantime, the
Tribunal went to the General Assembly of the OAS in Santiago, Chile
to ask that the General Assembly put pressure on Honduras to report
regarding non-compliance with the decision. Not one state—neither
the states that are parties to the Convention nor any state member of
the OAS—backed this request from the Court.

29. Judge, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Organization of American
States. The views expressed are those of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Commission or the OAS.
30. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 123 (Mar. 11, 2005).
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That was in 1991. In 1995, the complete opposite occurred. The
Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs of the OAS (“CJPA”)
urged Suriname to report to the Court regarding the non31
compliance of a decision in the case of Gangaram Panday. Once the
General Assembly approved the resolution, the state reported
immediately regarding compliance with the decision.
The real crisis of this system occurred at the beginning of the
current century, when the Court issued the decision regarding the
death penalty against Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad and Tobago
refused to report to the Court regarding compliance with the
decision and with the provisional measures of the Court. The Court
turned to the General Assembly again and informed them of the noncompliance.
Absolutely nothing happened.
The CJPA, the
Permanent Council, and the General Assembly did nothing.
What the CJPA approved was a general text, as I mentioned earlier,
stating that the states have the general obligation to comply with the
decisions of the cases to which they are parties. The general text
does not mention the state, nor does it mention the case. This
situation—which has not fundamentally evolved—arrived at a second
stage when Panama, interpreting the decision in the case of Baena
32
Ricardo et al. v. Panamá, asserted to the Tribunal that the Court did
not have jurisdiction to request information from the states in the
oversight stages of compliance with the decision. The Court, in a
well-known decision, asserted its jurisdiction and determined that the
Court has the ability to request information from the state regarding
the implementation of the decision, precisely in order to inform the
General Assembly in the Court’s annual report as to whether there
has been compliance with its decisions.
With this clarification at the beginning of the current decade, the
Inter-American Court began an extremely important stage by
deciding to not make categorical decisions as to whether there was
compliance once the deadline for the state to comply had passed.
Instead, the Court will proceed gradually to determine whether the
state has complied with the decision and will partially close the case
as the state complies with each obligation. There are a great number
of partially closed cases—those in which the state has only partially
complied with the decision—that can be viewed in the annual report.
Generally, the states quickly and satisfactorily comply with the
payment of reparation sums and, when it is possible, the restoration
31. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 12 (Jan. 21, 1994).
32. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 72 (Feb. 2, 2001).
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of rights, etc. But where the Inter-American system has not advanced
with regard to human rights is in the investigation and indictment of
those responsible for violations by domestic jurisdictions. This is the
reason, possibly, why things do not always advance when a case gets to
the CJPA, or when a report of non-compliance is written. Some
reasons, such as a lack of political will, do not allow a state to carry
out an investigation further than it has already been brought. In my
opinion, this is something that should be determined precisely in the
political sphere once the case leaves the hands of the Court and once
non-compliance has been declared.
I hope that someday the CJPA or a working group will look into the
state of the victims of the Inter-American Commission and of the
Court and make a determination or recommendation to the General
Assembly that allows the Court to definitively close the case from the
list of pending cases. Thank you.
C. Elizabeth Abi-Mershed

33

Thank you very much. It is really a pleasure to be here with you
today. I am going to speak a little bit about reparations, compliance,
34
and the Inter-American Commission. As you have heard, in the
Inter-American system, we often highlight the case system as being
very important because it provides a means to concretize what
otherwise abstract rights mean in practice. Through the cases, a
person can understand what their rights mean, and states can
understand what actions they have to prioritize to be in compliance
with their human rights obligations. Reparations, in turn, serve to
crystallize what is required of the state.
Reparations, when
implemented, show the difference that international human rights
law makes in the lives of individuals.
What do reparations look like in cases resolved by the InterAmerican Commission? As I mentioned, I am going to focus on the
case system as the most concrete way of seeing the relationship
between state obligation, a breach of that obligation, and the
measures necessary to remedy the breach. Without going too much
into the procedural aspects, as you know, the individual case system
before the Commission produces two possible results. One is the
resolution of a case through a friendly settlement, in which the
33. Assistant Executive Secretary, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Organization of American States. The views expressed are those of the speaker and
do not necessarily reflect those of the Commission or the OAS.
34. Comprehensive information about the Commission may be found through its
web page, http://www.cidh.org/, including all published reports in English and
Spanish.
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parties reach an agreement and the state undertakes to carry out a
series of measures to implement that agreement. Alternatively, if
such a settlement is not reached, the Commission will issue a merits
report that, if a violation has been established, will include a series of
recommendations directed to the state in question. In both of those
situations, the Commission will then initiate a follow-up process to
monitor compliance with what the state is required to do to discharge
its obligations.
I want to differentiate between the Inter-American Commission
and the Inter-American Court. The Court has Convention-based
authority to issue orders, including those for the payment of
compensation as well as for other forms of reparation, and member
states that have accepted the Court’s contentious jurisdiction
expressly commit themselves to implement its decisions. The
Commission, on the other hand, issues recommendations derived
from its more general Charter and Convention-based mandate. I
want to make it clear that, as a matter of international treaty law,
states are obliged to use good faith to comply with those
recommendations. Accordingly, in the final resolution of a case
through a merits report, the Commission will have issued a series of
recommendations that the state concerned is required to implement.
The recommendations would usually include the investigation,
prosecution, and punishment of those responsible for actually
perpetrating the violation.
They would probably include fair
compensation for the victims and might very well include legislative
policy or other measures aimed at ensuring the non-repetition of the
violations, as well as the correction of structural problems. The state
then has to report back on the measures it has taken to comply. If
the state has fully complied with all of the recommendations, then
the Inter-American Commission may deem the matter resolved. Full
compliance remains disturbingly rare. If there has not been full
compliance, then the Commission decides to either publish the
report or send the case to the Inter-American Court. Given that you
have heard today from several judges of the Court, I am going to
speak about those final friendly settlements or merits reports that the
Commission publishes and thereafter supervises through its follow-up
procedures.
One of the points that I want to make today as part of this crossregional dialogue is that the Inter-American Commission now has a
defined follow-up procedure, and this was not always the case. When
the Commission adopted significant changes to its Rules of
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Procedure in 2001, it included an express follow-up procedure. The
idea, from the Commission’s point of view, was that it would be
sending more cases to the Inter-American Court, but for those cases
that remained before it for final resolution, the Commission had to
find more and better ways of moving forward on compliance with its
recommendations. As from 2001, the Commission publishes a table
in its annual report that deals with compliance with friendly
settlement agreements and merits reports. The table is divided into
three categories: full compliance, partial compliance, and pending
compliance.
This categorization reflects some of the ideas underlying the
follow-up process as a whole—ideas that include patience and
persistence. Experience within the system indicates that a state may
be required to take many actions in order to fully implement
recommendations, and that such actions may require time and imply
a dynamic process that evolves. There may need to be some space to
see that those actions come to full fruition, so the Inter-American
Commission continues to monitor the state over the years. In fact, all
of the cases that the Commission started monitoring in 2001—cases
from 2000 and forward—we are monitoring now.
What do we do in the follow-up process? The Inter-American
Commission asks for information from the parties, from the state and
the petitioner, to be able to contrast and compare the perspectives on
what has been done to implement the recommendations and what
remains to be done. We transmit information between the parties.
The Commission also has the ability to hold working meetings or
hearings. In fact, we are having a hearing during this upcoming
period of sessions on compliance with the recommendations in an
individual case. In some cases, the issue of compliance can be
incorporated into the agenda of working visits to enable the
Commission to converse with the authorities of the state about what is
being done or what needs to be done.
The point I want to emphasize is that having a defined procedure
has made a difference in making the compliance phase—which, at
the end of the day, is the most important phase—more visible and
concrete. The procedure makes the issue of compliance more
present in the agenda of the system and its users, and this has
produced some positive results.

35. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Art. 46, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the InterAmerican System, OAS/ser.C/V/I4 Rev. 12 (2007).
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The results of the follow-up procedure can also tell us some things
about how we are doing with compliance in general. If we look at the
cases that the Inter-American Commission has reported on in this
follow-up process—covering reports adopted between 2000 until
2006, and leaving aside the cases that went to the Inter-American
Court—these would include sixty merits reports and fifty-three
friendly settlement reports, or a total of 113 cases in the follow-up
36
process to date. Of that total, there has been full compliance with
reparations in twelve cases, partial compliance in seventy-four, and
compliance is pending in twenty-seven. Picking up on the theme that
Judge Ventura Robles mentioned, partial compliance is the name of
the game, being the more common result. Fifteen years ago or so,
there would have been very little compliance to discuss in terms of
the cases decided by the Commission. At present, we have partial
compliance in a great many cases, and that partial compliance has
had a tremendous impact in those cases.
I think it is relevant to mention that in terms of tendencies, one
can see that compliance with friendly settlement agreements is much
higher than compliance with merits reports issued by the InterAmerican Commission. That may be a natural consequence of the
process of negotiation and confidence building and the taking of
steps toward a friendly settlement.
I want to move on to a few observations about what the process
shows in terms of the concrete results of the cases resolved by the
Inter-American Commission.
The first point has to do with
compensation. While the individual case process is not about the
money for most people, money can be extremely important for both
practical and symbolic reasons. It is important for transmitting the
question of state liability to the citizenry through the taxing power. If
the citizens have to pay for violations of human rights, the idea is that
they will be more aware, and they will require more accountability
from their officials. So it may have an impact structurally as well.
What we can see from the follow-up process before the InterAmerican Commission, in terms of both merits and friendly
settlement reports, is that victims have received over six million
dollars in compensation during the five or six years that we have been
engaged in this form of reporting. Compensation has also been
given in the form of homes, scholarships, annuities, health care, and
pensions. Following up on a point that was made by the judges of the
36. This information is based on a review of material published in the Annual
Report of the IACHR 2007, chapter III, follow up, and is available at
http://www.cidh.org/.
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Inter-American Court, the highest rate of state compliance is with
measures related to compensation. In just about half of the
Commission cases in follow-up, the victims have received full or
partial monetary compensation.
The next point concerns legislation, as the Inter-American
Commission frequently recommends reforms in this area. In more
than half of its merits reports, the Commission recommended some
kind of change in legislation. The rate of compliance with these
recommendations is much lower than it is with compensation. While
the absolute number of changes adopted is lower, the impact of the
measures adopted has in some cases been dramatic. For example, we
37
could mention the case of Maria da Penha v. Brazil, which was the
first case about the state responsibility vis-à-vis domestic violence.
One of the recommendations had to do with legislative reforms.
Through the follow-up process, the case remained visible, and it took
a number of years before the state finally adopted the legislative
changes. Finally, in 2006, Brazil adopted a new law against domestic
violence called the “Maria da Penha” law—named after the victim in
this case. The new law represents a tremendous advance in terms of
the legislative framework and protection.
We could also look at the dialogue, if you will, between the system
and several countries in the Caribbean about the mandatory
imposition of the death penalty for certain classes of crimes.
Through the cases and the recommendations, and through the
dialogue between the national courts and the Inter-American Court
as well as with courts beyond the Inter-American system, one can see
a very important change over time whereby a number of countries
have modified the legislative framework applicable to the death
penalty. We can also see a change in the juvenile death penalty vis-àvis a series of cases with respect to the United States, subsequent to
which the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the imposition of the
penalty in cases involving persons who were juveniles when they
38
committed their crimes. In terms of investigation, prosecution, and
punishment, it is a very frequent recommendation and it is very
infrequently complied with. Judge Ventura Robles already spoke
37. Case 12.051, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/ser.L/V/II.111,
doc.20 rev. (2001), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/
TOC.htm/ (follow hyperlink under Chapter III(c)(5)).
38. The Inter-American Commission reports issued just prior to the U.S.
Supreme Court ruling are Report 62/02, merits, case 12.285, Michael Domingues,
United States, October 22, 2002, in Annual Report of the IACHR 2002; Report
101/03, case 12.412, Napoleon Beazley, United States, December 29, 2003, in Annual
Report of the IACHR 2003.
Both annual reports may be found at
http://www.cidh.org/.
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about that insofar as the work of the Court is concerned. In terms of
symbolic reparations or guarantees of non-repetition, the kinds of
recommendations and actions we see through Commission cases
would include recognition of responsibility, dedication of streets,
parks, or monuments, and the passage of measures such as increased
training for officials.
There are a number of other things that we could discuss about
reparations and compliance in the Inter-American system, but there
are two points on which I want to close. One is to follow up on the
point that the engagement of member states in the process is clearly
crucial, not only individually vis-à-vis their own cases, but also
collectively through their participation in the political organs of the
OAS. The idea is raised every once in a while that there should be
some kind of mechanism through the political organs to supervise
compliance, but up until now that has not assumed a concrete form.
The final theme would be that we have seen a number of really
important advances in the systems: the sending of more cases to the
Inter-American Court and the further incorporation of the voice of
the victim in the process. I really think that the next thing we need to
see for a major advance in the system is a legal aid system. If you look
at who has access to reparations, you are looking at who has access to
the system. And until the Inter-American system has a functioning
legal aid system and a fully funded set of organs—Commission and
Court—it will be difficult to advance further with the question of
access to the system and the resolution of past human rights
violations. Thank you.
D. Claudio Grossman
As we move into the African system, different issues become
relevant for comparison—for example, the concept of victim. In
addition, the issue of reparations—their scope and elements—is
crucial for human rights law. The Inter-American system offers a very
broad system of reparations that include material and moral
damages, measures of non-repetition, changes in legislation, and
symbolic reparations. Because of the scope of these measures, the
Inter-American system has developed the most comprehensive system
of reparations currently in force in international human rights law.
Needless to say, it would be interesting to hear about the African
experience in this area and to see whether there is a different
emphasis as a result of the specific regional conditions—for example,
group rights as well as economic, social, and cultural rights, etc.
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As Elizabeth was mentioning, it is important to note that there is a
high degree of participation by both victims and states in the InterAmerican system. However, there is a higher level of compliance
with friendly settlements than with Inter-American Court decisions.
This is not surprising given the high involvement of the parties in the
negotiations that lead to a settlement. Court decisions are mostly
complied with in matters of payment. It becomes important to study
the Inter-American experience when ensuring compliance with other
components of integral reparation, particularly investigation and
punishment of those responsible for human rights violations. Again,
the African experience would be extremely relevant for comparative
purposes.
In recent years, the Inter-American system—the Commission and
the Court—has developed a system to follow up on its past decisions,
commitments, and friendly settlements. Pursuant to this new system,
past decisions now remain on the docket of the Commission and the
Court until they are fully complied with. The Commission and Court
schedule hearings on compliance allowing both the petitioners and
the states to express their views. Then, the supervisory organs report
on the status of compliance to the OAS. Unfortunately, the political
organs have not fully exercised their role as guarantors of the system.
In fact, the General Assembly does little more than acknowledge the
Reports from the Commission and Court. Further development of
the system would require these organs to stop standing idle in the
face of non-compliance. In order to move in that direction, steps we
should consider include, for example, individualized discussions
concerning states that fail to comply with Commission and Court
decisions. Sharing experiences with other regional systems enriches
our analysis of the political and legal issues involved.
With these brief remarks, let us now hear from the African system.
I give the floor to Commissioner Nyanduga from the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Commission”).
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Let me first of all thank the Washington College of Law, the
MacArthur Foundation, and the Inter-American human rights system
for extending an invitation to me and to the African Commission to
participate in this conference on regional human rights systems. At
this juncture, let me also extend the apologies of my colleagues who
could not make it here today. Looking at the issue of remedies and
the challenges to implementation, and listening to the presentations
this morning, I thought I would change my presentation to first
describe the challenges that the African system has been facing in
terms of effecting remedies and implementing recommendations.
The African regional system is currently in evolution. This is a
system whose centerpiece is the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (“African Charter”), which established the African
Commission in 1987. The African Commission has now been in
existence for the last twenty-one years; in fact, tomorrow, the twentyfirst of October, we begin the twenty-second anniversary of the
formation of African Commission. That day is marked by the African
Commission as African Human Rights day. All fifty-three member
states of the African Union have ratified the African Charter. The
African Charter was developed and adopted by African states during
the era of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). However, at
that time, we saw in Africa that the existence of the OAU was also
marked by many human rights challenges, particularly in term of
governance issues—mainly lack of respect for human rights and
democratic principles.
Around the year 2001, upon the entry into force of the Constitutive
Act of the African Union, we see the establishment of a new
organization on the continent: the African Union. Within the
39. Commissioner Bahame Tom Mukirya Nyanduga, a Tanzania lawyer, studied
law at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and graduate studies at ISS, The
Hague, The Netherlands, and LSE London, UK. He was elected to the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in July 2003, by the African Union
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, in Maputo Mozambique, for a six-year
term ending in November 2009. He served as the African Commission’s Special
Rapporteur for Refugees, Asylum Seekers, IDPs, and Migrants in Africa. He was
appointed a member of the Steering Committee of Experts established by the
Representative of the United Nations Secretary General on the Human Rights of
IDPs, which developed a Manual for Law and Policymakers on the Protection of
IDPs, and served as a Consultant to the African Union Commission on the drafting
of the African Union Convention on the Prevention of Internal Displacement in
Africa. He has also served as president of the Tanganyika Law Society (2000) and
East African Law Society, (2004–06), the national and regional bar associations
respectively.
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Constitutive Act itself, which is the legal instrument establishing the
African Union, there are key principles that introduce on the
continent a new human rights architecture and a new disposition
towards respect for human rights. And this is what we say:
henceforth, the African Union and its member states have taken on
board the issue of ensuring respect for democratic principles and
respect for the rule of law, human rights, and good governance.
Africa is reconstructing a continent respectful of the human rights of
its people. And we believe, in so doing, in the long run it will
enhance the demonstration of a human rights culture on the
continent.
This legal construction is broadly reflected in two key articles,
namely Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act, which outline the
objectives and principles of the African Union. Of these articles, one
states that the African Union itself and its members shall respect
human rights on the continent in accordance with the terms of the
African Charter.
The Act provides for different organs and
institutions to guide the Union in carrying out its functions. It
includes a number of new principles to mark a paradigm shift from
the previous organization—for instance, issues such as establishing
the principle of interference in a member state in a situation of
serious, grave, or massive violations of human rights on the
continent. And this is distinct from the principle of absolute
sovereignty, which previously led to the glorification of the principle
of non-interference in the internal affairs of African states during the
era of the OAU.
A few other concepts have been introduced into the Constitutive
Act. For instance, the principle of elimination of gender inequality
has actually brought the issue of ensuring that the rights of women
are protected in Africa to the forefront. Another concept that will
have an impact is the principle of condemnation and the rejection of
access to power through unconstitutional means. Now, another
aspect that is central to the establishment of a culture of human
rights on the continent has been the move towards the adoption of a
number of human rights instruments. For instance, the protocol on
the establishment of the African Court on Human Rights, which
entered into force in early 2005, led to the establishment of the
African Human Rights Court in 2006 and the election of judges. I
am pleased to say one of the judges is here today.
There is now a body that will complement the mandate of the
African Commission in protecting human rights on the continent.
Other mechanisms or instruments that have been adopted on the
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continent include the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa and
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of Children. In
addition to the court that was mentioned earlier, there is a protocol
that merges two African courts. The other court is the Court of
Justice of the African Union that is now merged to become the Court
of Justice and Human Rights; the merger protocol was adopted in
July of this year by the Assembly of the African Union. This
description explains the legal instruments and institutional
mechanisms in place which aim to ensure the implementation of
remedies, if any, on the continent.
The experience of the African Commission has shown that one of
the many challenges to implementing remedies on the continent, as
mentioned by one of the speakers on the Inter-American system, has
been that the recommendations of the African Commission are not
binding. The African Commission has not undertaken a study on the
problem of non-implementation to establish the extent to which
remedies or recommendations have been put into effect where
violations have been discovered—to what extent have these
recommendations been implemented. Other studies, particularly
those by academic institutions, tend to show that the majority of these
recommendations have not been implemented. A study carried out
by the Center for Human Rights of the University of Pretoria in
South Africa gave a rough indication of fourteen percent full
implementation by African states, twenty-six percent partial
implementation, and about sixty percent of the recommendations
remaining unimplemented.
Now this is notwithstanding the general commitment that a state
party to the African Charter undertakes when it ratifies the African
Charter. Article 1 of the Charter obliges a state party to undertake
various measures—administrative, legislative, and other measures—to
ensure that the obligations under the African Charter, which they
assume voluntarily, are implemented. In terms of follow-up, the
African Commission, as I see it, has not undertaken any effective
measures to examine the extent to which its recommendations have
been implemented. However, the African Commission has two
opportunities. First, when we undertake promotional missions to
member states to ensure that each member state with an issue
pending against it has an opportunity to inquire and to examine the
extent to which that state has complied with the recommendations
issued by the Commission. Second, when the states have submitted
their periodic reports, there is an opportunity for the Commission to
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examine the state and the extent to which it has implemented
previous recommendations.
As I mentioned earlier, the establishment of the African Human
Rights Court has provided a mechanism for the effective
implementation of recommendations. Both the Commission and the
Court are in the process of harmonizing their new procedures
through which recommendations are likely to be implemented if the
Commission brings cases to the court. The Commission is one of
those parties, under the protocol that established the Court, which is
entitled to bring cases to the Court. However, there are a number of
constraints on the Commission in spite of the entry into force of the
protocol establishing the Court. For example, only one or two states
so far have ratified the protocol and given the Court the power to
entertain cases brought by individuals and NGOs.
This is important because the jurisprudence of the African
Commission, developed over the past twenty-one years of its
existence, has developed as result of cases predominantly brought by
individuals before the Commission. So, unless many of the states that
are parties to the protocol give power to the Court, then we are not
likely to see the court effectively implementing remedies against
violations on the continent, let alone developing human rights
jurisprudence on the continent.
There are some other recommendations, but due to the lack of
time, I will not be able to go through them. Nevertheless, it is
important to emphasize the role of the national human rights
institutions in the continent which might assist the Commission,
because within the roughly thirty-six states where they have been
established, they are likely to be patronized by the African
Commission to ensure that these recommendations are
implemented. Thank you.
******
F.

40

Charlotte de Broutelles

The European Convention system is a quite original one because it
entrusts its executive body, the Committee of Ministers, with
40. Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, Department for the
Execution of the European Court of Human Rights Judgments. The opinions
expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not engage the
responsibility of the Council of Europe. They should not be regarded as placing
upon the legal instruments mentioned in it any official interpretation capable of
binding the governments of member states, the Council of Europe’s statutory organs
or any organ set up by virtue of the European Convention on Human Rights.
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supervising the implementation of the decisions of its judicial body,
the European Court. This is provided for in Article 46, paragraph 2
of the Convention, which states that “[t]he final judgment of the
European Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers,
41
which shall supervise its execution.” But to date, there is nothing
more in the ECHR regarding the implementation of the European
Court judgments in order to apply the first paragraph of Article 46,
which states “[c]ontracting [p]arties undertake to abide by the final
judgment of the European Court in any case to which they are
42
parties.”
On the basis of this sole article, the Committee of Ministers,
assisted by the Department for the Execution of the European Court
43
judgments, which is a department of the Council of Europe
Secretariat, has drawn up an effective—although perfectible—system
of implementation of the European Court’s judgments. To have an
idea of the scope of control of implementation by the Committee of
Ministers, I suggest that you refer to the outline I prepared for this
meeting. I would prefer to share with you some of the means we have
developed to improve the execution process in the challenging
period we are facing now because, while there are more and more
cases to supervise, the time we have to solve them is the same.
Time, in the context of implementation of a European Court
judgment, is a crucial parameter. It is a crucial parameter when it
44
comes to taking individual measures in favor of the applicant after
the European Court found a violation of the Convention in its
judgment. Individual measures are taken in order to put the
applicant as far as possible into the situation that he or she would
have been in had the violation not occurred in an effort to achieve
restitutio in integrum. In some cases, these measures start with putting
an end to the continuing violation of the Convention, and in some
cases, they include trying to avoid time passing by. In some cases,
however, there is no possibility left to adopt any individual measures.
I am thinking in particular of cases where the European Court found
a procedural violation of Article 2, on right to life, or Article 3,
prohibition of torture, and where the Committee of Ministers
considered that there is a continuing obligation to conduct an
41. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 46(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
42. Id. art. 46(1).
43. For more information, see the website of the Department for the Execution
of the Court’s Judgments, http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_rights/execution/.
44. For an overview of individual measures adopted by member states, see
http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/execution/H-Exec(2006)2_IM_960e.doc.
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effective investigation. I am also thinking of cases concerning
custody rights.
Time is also an important parameter when it comes to general
45
measures, the aim of which is for the European Court to avoid the
repetition of that kind of violation. This is first and foremost
important for the individuals themselves. But I also have to mention
that now it is also important for the Convention system itself, as the
system could collapse if the number of new applications keeps on
increasing at the rate it has been increasing for years. In this context,
the Committee of Ministers adopted a resolution on judgments,
leaving an underlying systemic problem. The European Court is thus
invited to identify in each judgment what it considers to be an
underlying systemic problem, and to identify the source of this
problem if possible. These are what we now call the “pilot
judgments.”
Another requirement we have in mind in supervising execution is
quality. The judgment has to be implemented; not only the
judgment itself, but the whole judgment. This supposes that the
reason the violation occurred is correctly identified and that
pertinent measures are taken. There is a fundamental principle in
the Convention system—the principle of subsidarity. It is enshrined
in several articles of the Convention, and it has some consequences
on the supervision of execution: respondent states remain free to
choose the means by which they will implement the European Court
judgments.
The European Court, itself, has held in several
judgments that “subject to monitoring by the Committee of
Ministers, the respondent state remains free to choose the means by
which it will discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the
Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the
46
conclusions set out in the European Court’s judgment.”
Nevertheless, the European Court tends to indicate in some
judgments the type of measure that the respondent states might take,
either when the nature of the violation found leaves no choice about
the measure required to remedy it, or when the European Court
found that a system situation or problem exists.
Of course, it helps to have the European Court indicate or suggest
the measures to be taken in the judgment itself. But it does not
prevent the Committee of Ministers from performing its supervisory
role. Furthermore, it should be noted that the domestic problems
45. For an overview of general measures adopted by member states, see
http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/execution/H-Exec(2006)1_GM_960e.doc.
46. Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 249.
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underlying a violation are sometimes not obvious at the first
examination, and they start to appear clearly only after long
discussion with the authorities of the respondent state. Sometimes,
the execution of the judgments requires very complex measures.
Perhaps the danger of expanding this method is that a respondent
state may conclude that they have no measures to adopt because the
European Court judgment does not indicate a measure in a specific
case. And, perhaps, this method is only really efficient for simple
cases.
As for now, with or without indication by the European Court,
member states have undertaken an impressive number of reforms.
Just one example: it is almost obvious to every member state today
that when the European Court finds a violation of the right to a fair
trial in a criminal proceeding, the proceeding has to be reopened. It
is almost obvious to date, but it was not at all obvious eight or ten
years ago. This common understanding results from long discussions
during the meetings of the Committee of Ministers, and also from
the work of experts, who drafted recommendations to all member
states on the reexamination or reopening of certain cases of domestic
level following a judgment of the European Court. Several member
states have adopted legislation to allow for the reopening of
proceedings. For example, Belgium recently adopted a new law to
this end on April 1, 2007. France adopted such a law in 2000; this
possibility also exists in Ukrainian law. To me, this is clearly a success
that can be attributed to the collective aspect of the execution of the
European Court judgments.
The collective aspect of the execution of the European Court
judgments is fundamental in the European system; therefore, the
selection of the twenty-five to thirty cases that can be discussed during
a meeting of the Committee of Ministers out of the 6,000 cases
pending before the Committee of Ministers is of great importance.
There are four meetings a year specifically devoted to the supervision
of execution, each extending over three days during which measures
envisioned or adopted by respondent states are debated. And there
are real debates during the meetings of the Committee of Ministers.
Delegations are more and more involved in cases against other
countries, both to learn from their experiences, and, if necessary, to
put pressure on their peers.
In recent years, the Committee of Ministers modified its rules and
its working methods in order to be more efficient and to be more
transparent. For example, although an applicant cannot take part in
the Committee meetings, he or she can take part in the proceeding
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by sending communications. Non-governmental organizations, as
well as national institutions for the promotion and protection of
human rights, can also send communications to the Committee of
Ministers. Furthermore, since 2007, reports on all cases pending
before the Committee are published online on the website of the
Department for the Execution of the European Court judgments.
The annotated agenda of the meetings of the Committee of Ministers
and the decisions taken at the end of the meetings are also made
public. All of these measures contribute to a better execution of
judgments.
In 2004, the Committee of Ministers also adopted a package of
recommendations to member states concerning mainly education
and professional training on the Convention and the improvement of
domestic remedies.
These recommendations draw practical
consequences of the principle of subsidarities that I mentioned
earlier. Systematic publication of the European Courts’ judgments in
the respondent states concerned and, in some cases, specific
dissemination to judges or categories of civil servants affected by the
judgment is required when the Committee deals with general
measures. As a result, the Convention and the case law of the
European Court are directly applied at a domestic level. It is hoped
that publication of the European Courts’ judgments in all member
states will enhance the direct effect of the Convention and, at the
same time, start developing the erga omnes effect.
In conclusion, I would like to come back to the starting point of my
presentation. It must appear awkward to entrust an executive body
with supervising the implementation of decisions of a judicial body.
But it works, and it works quite well. All the recent measures taken
regarding transparency of the work of the Committee of Ministers,
and the aim of developing civil society participation, can be regarded
as a guarantee of a full, if not a prompt implementation. I wish I had
the time to mention the cooperation with the other bodies of the
Council of Europe, such as the Parliamentary Assembly or the
Commissioner of Human Rights, which may play an important role in
facilitating the execution of the European Court judgments. We are
in a continuous process of improving our proceedings, and I am
therefore looking forward to hearing from your experience. Thank
you for your attention.
G. Discussion
Claudio Grossman: Thank you very much. I want to thank the
speakers for presenting their views within the margins that we have
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here. It is difficult to be between the lunch and the comments that
we have here, but I would like to give the opportunity for a couple of
questions. Are there questions or comments?
******
Andrew Drzemczewski: Since we are talking about advocacy before
international human rights organs, please permit me three quick
comments.
My first point: even if the case of your client has been declared
inadmissible, say by the European Court or the Inter-American
Commission, you may still have “won” the case. How come? Simply
because your client—a person who was about to be deported—may in
the meantime have been given the right to stay in the country for
humanitarian purposes. The application is declared inadmissible, so
you lost the case, but in reality, your client got what he or she wanted!
As far as he or she is concerned, the case was won.
My second point: legal advocacy can entail pursuing matters
outside the classic structures of international human rights “legal”
litigation. Here I refer to, inter alia, political monitoring procedures,
such as those carried out by the Monitoring Committee of the
Parliamentary Assembly, and the so-called confidential “compliance
with commitments” procedures setup by the Committee of Ministers,
the executive organ of the Council of Europe.
And last but not least: the question of “compliance.” Insofar as
the supervision of Strasbourg Court judgments by the Committee of
Ministers is concerned, I believe that the compliance rate is within
the region of ninety-six to ninety-seven percent. But such raw
statistics must be taken with a pinch of salt, as, for example, it took
Belgium eight years following the Strasbourg Court’s finding in the
47
Marckx v. Belgium to bring its legal system fully into conformity with
the requirements of the European Human Rights Convention.
******
Audience: We all know that reparations should include public
apology, public acknowledgement of responsibility, etc. Do you think
that there is a conflict between that form of reparation and existing
measures in different human rights systems in trying to save the face
of the concerned nations? For example: by holding private or closed
sessions, by not publishing reports in case of full compliance, or by

47. 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 330 (1979).
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any other ways that may help to save the face of nation. Thank you
very much.
******
Audience: Just two quick questions to the Inter-American Court and
to the European Court representatives. To the Inter-American
Court, is there any consideration given to doing pilot judgments in
the Inter-American system?
And to the European Court
representative, it seems that both systems are like an elephant in a
China shop—you have Russia, we have the United States. There
seems to be little will on the part of either super- or almostsuperpower to comply with our systems. What is the thinking in the
European system now as to what do with Russia?
******
Audience: In my country, they have not accomplished the public
apology to the victims. Maybe the moral sanction is harder than to
say “I am sorry” to the victims or to publish in the newspaper the
decision of the Inter-American Court.
******
Audience: I want to touch on something Ms. Abi-Mershed said
earlier, that using these reparations and passing the cost on to the tax
payers in these countries is a way to influence political will, but also
we need to make sure that the information is passed onto them—that
if the cost is passed on but the information is never disseminated to
these people, that this what they are paying for. I was just wondering
if you could possibly touch upon how much information is passed on,
how much is reported in the press, and what NGOs or other
organizations can do to make sure that this information is known by
people in these countries?
******
Audience: Thank you to my brother, the Commissioner from
Tanzania. I would like him to evaluate of the impact of the African
Commission. Does he think that the Commission, since its inception,
has made a difference in the cause and process of opening up
political space in Africa, democratization in the respects of human
rights on the continent?
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******
Claudio Grossman: Would anyone care to comment on the
questions asked, and if someone also wants to discuss what can be
learned from each other?
******
Sergio García Ramírez: Just quickly, I believe that from what has
been said, there are many things that we can learn. Based upon my
understanding of the characteristics of each system, it is not necessary
to impose on each system the rules and regulations of the other,
because each works within circumstances and conditions that are
sometimes profoundly different. We see what the achievements of
each system are within the circumstances of each.
Second, there was a question about “pilot” decisions. Currently, in
the Inter-American Court, there are no “pilot” decisions—or said
another way, they are all “pilot” decisions. There are relatively few
decisions, and I would say that they are all relevant. I would even
dare to say that each one of them is another step toward a regime of
reparations, and there is a certain track. Whether this is a glass-halffull or a glass-half-empty approach depends on who is looking at it. I
believe that the progress has been very great in the last ten years.
Things have been achieved, not necessarily in the persecution of
those responsible, but there have been achievements that before
seemed impossible within the near future. In a relatively short
timeframe, there have been various achievements regarding
reparations.
Third, there was talk as well of the issue of public apologies and
whether they are satisfactory for the victim. The Inter-American
Court always asks for public apologies and orders the publication of
the relevant parts of the decision—the resolutions. This is not done
out of a concept of apology, but rather, this is done under the
concept that the Court recognizes the responsibility of the state in
the matter. The issue of the imposition of apologies or the
recognition by the state is another issue that the Court has dealt with.
Now, let me say that I am cautious regarding the issue of public
apologies because normally the one apologizing is not the
government that was in power when the violations occurred. And the
person who seeks the apology is someone who does not have
anything to do with the violations committed. However, it is a
symbolic gesture that contributes to the respect of human rights and
will continue.
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******
Elizabeth Abi-Mershed: Three things. The first point is that this
opportunity today really shows what situation we are in, in the
different regions and between the regions, and that is a situation of
dialogue, evolution, and dynamism. And the question of reparations
and compliance is really a question of shared responsibility in looking
for ways to advance, and we can learn so much from each other in
this regard. I want to mention something else about the patterns of
compliance that we can see before the Inter-American Commission,
and they are very obvious conclusions. One is that there is higher
compliance in simple situations, there is higher compliance in high
profile cases. There is higher compliance when civil society uses
cases as part of a larger strategy at the national level. And so when
civil society creates resonance at the national level, you see a definite
increase in the level and the quality of compliance. There is higher
compliance when friendly settlement is used as part of a larger state
policy, and you can see patterns of friendly settlements coming in
blocks when there is a convergence of state policy to engage with the
Inter-American system. So that ends up being quite effective.
And the other point that I wanted to make is that the friendly
settlement process poses a series of very legitimate legal questions for
states, and they are legal questions that require a solution. And one
of the things that we are seeing in the system right now is that states
are dialoguing with each other about how to solve some of these
problems. So we see things such as, in Argentina, the utilization of ad
hoc tribunals to establish monetary compensation, which is so
difficult to negotiate in some cases. It is just so difficult for the
government to arrive at from a unilateral position. And the ad hoc
tribunals have actually had a great deal of efficacy. The other
example I would mention is that in Colombia, in the administrative
contentious jurisdiction, there has been an effort to incorporate the
principles and the standard of criteria of the Inter-American system
so that the judgments that come through that system are consistent
with the Inter-American norms, and also so that there is a mechanism
to comply with Inter-American Commission and Court decisions
through the administrative contentious jurisdiction. I will leave it
there, thank you.
******
Judge Ventura Robles: Very briefly. The comment of our colleague
from the European Council was extremely interesting because it
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precisely brought to light the importance of having a council of
ministers monitoring compliance with the decisions. This, I believe,
is a fundamental problem in the Inter-American system because we
lack this oversight. After Elizabeth’s comments, it appears that the
Inter-American Court and Commission are following the same path
of participation and partial non-compliance of decisions and I believe
that ministerial oversight is the only way to lead the way to a better
system of monitoring which would result in ultimate compliance with
decisions. Thank you.
******
Bahame Tom Mukirya Nyanduga: I would like to respond to the
comments regarding an evaluation of the impact of the African
Commission in terms of democratization and opening space on the
continents. If I may say, first of all, with respect to the transition in
the Commission over the first ten years and the second half of the
twenty years of its existence, I think there has been a marked
improvement in terms of the output of the work that is coming out of
the Commission at different levels. I think we have concentrated
mostly on the decisions which have led to remedies when addressing
the communication issues. However, the Commission has also
undertaken a considerable weight in terms of their reporting on
certain key issues. There is a very major report on issues of
indigenous populations which has come out of the Commission, as
well resolutions we each have addressed issues of governance on the
continent. And they have all been used for advocacy on human
rights issues on the continent.
On the issue of democratization, in November of 2005, the
Commission adopted a number of resolutions addressing key
democratization issues on the continent. For example, after the
elections in Ethiopia in May and June of 2005—and we know the
outcome of those elections and the balance that ensued—the
Commission adopted resolutions condemning the same. There was
an attack on the judiciary in Uganda, and the Commission adopted a
resolution condemning the same. So what I am saying is that, as
much as we might not be able to measure the extent in terms of
influencing the democratic space on the continent, the Commission
has been able to highlight some of these issues.
******
Charlotte de Broutelles: I will try to reply to the difficult questions put
to me regarding Russian cases. I do not think we can speak of non-
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compliance actually. Our problem is to have the judgment executed
or implemented within a reasonable time, and there is no provision
in the Convention to this end. The only thing which is provided in
the Council of Europe statute is that a member state may be
suspended from its right of representation or may be requested to
withdraw from the organization, or the Committee of Ministers may
decide that a member state has ceased to be a member of the Council
of Europe. But this would not be a good reply to a delayed
compliance. Therefore, experts are thinking of other measures
which could be taken in cases of delayed compliance.
I would like to draw your attention to the huge amount of reform
which has been undertaken in Turkey. Ten years ago, people were
asking the same question about Turkey that you are asking today
about Russia. Of course, there are still reforms to be undertaken in
member states, but a lot has been done already. Some cases have
been on the Agenda of the Committee of Ministers for several years.
But things are moving on, and they move on in every member state,
therefore, in Russia, too.
******
Claudio Grossman: Allow me to thank the panelists for their
important contributions. I believe they have enhanced our
understanding on the overall situation affecting of the regional
systems and their experiences on concrete matters, such as
reparations. We have also witnessed that supervisory organs have
performed a creative function in this area. In the Inter-American
system, for example, the Court and Commission, within the
parameters of the Convention, developed the content of reparations
as well as the procedural role of petitioners. They thus contributed,
inter alia, to confront impunity by giving a voice to the victims
themselves.
III. WORKING LUNCH
48

A. Paolo Carozza, Victor Abramovich & Felipe González
Paolo Carozza: I am very grateful to Dean Grossman for giving us
the opportunity to be here at lunchtime. As I think you know, the
Inter-American Commission is in session today and in these weeks,
and therefore it is difficult for us to be here for a length of time
48. President (2008-09), Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and
Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School.
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throughout the day—as much as we would love to because all the
themes being treated are of great importance and utility to us at the
Commission. But unfortunately, we also have to have our sessions
and working meetings.
So we envisioned having a very informal lunch with you where we
could have a lot of open conversation and exchange about the
themes that you have been dealing with and how they relate to the
Commission’s work, as well as other things that may be of interest to
you.
I have to say that my own interest in participating in this
conference and in this discussion has only been amplified in the last
months because of meetings that I myself have had as President of
the Inter-American Commission, both with representatives of the
African system who came to visit us in Washington, and during visits
that I have made to the institutions of the European system. In both
cases, I found the meetings extremely useful to open up horizons of
discussion, analysis, and reflection about the strengths, weaknesses,
problems, and convergences of the different systems. And so I think
the whole enterprise here is an extremely useful exercise.
On the one hand, I am a great believer and advocate of the need
for and the importance of regional systems in the global system of
human rights precisely because I think they have proved to be as they
were first intended; in many ways, they are able to be more effective,
deeper, and more solid than the global system. They are closer to the
states and citizens they affect. They are parts of communities of
nations and peoples that often are bound by certain political or
historical or legal and cultural/linguistic ties, and that helps to
construct more solid systems. So normatively, that is where there has
often been greater development, and in terms of implementation
and effectiveness, it is often where we see the highest degrees of
compliance and integration of systems.
But that whole structure, I believe, has its costs, too. The cost is
that the regional systems, when they operate on their own, carry with
them, necessarily, the risk of a certain degree of insularity from one
another. Certain kinds of problems are intractable in that region,
and it is difficult to see them from the outside and to imagine
different kinds of solutions for them. Certain of the vices of the
system may not be apparent to us until we see them through the eyes
of other systems and other experience.
I think the comparison between the systems that we are doing
today and that needs to be done more constantly is valuable as a way
of generating dynamism, bringing consistency across the systems, and
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helping to fashion norms and practices and processes that have some
consistency but that arise from the bottom up, so that they can also
be more effective. But I think it is also important to realize that the
comparison and confrontation between the systems does not
necessarily need to be with the aim of bringing them closer together
or making them more alike. In some cases, it might be useful to have
the comparison precisely in order to delineate and justify what would
be the proper differences between them; the way the different
systems address different kinds of needs in their regions and different
kinds of dynamics among varying peoples and states. Being able to
make us more critically aware of the way in which our jurisprudence
or our procedural practices and so forth do justifiably differ from
European ones or African ones is good; it makes us more aware and
more conscious of the peculiarities and strengths as well as the
weaknesses of our practices.
I think the kinds of issues on which that kind of comparison is
really fruitful are very evident in the conversation today. Diane and
the other organizers have identified three areas in which it is very
evident that the comparison and confrontation between the systems
can lead to a lot of self-reflection about ways to improve and ways in
which the different dynamics lend to different results and different
kinds of solutions. I will not say more about those, because you are
having such a rich discussion, unless people have specific questions
for us. But I thought that my colleagues, Victor Abramovich and
Felipe González, and I might reflect a little bit, and provoke further
conversation on some of the other areas in which comparison,
exchange, dialogue, and confrontation could be useful to expand the
discussion.
One of the areas that seems most evident to me has to do simply
with the structural aspects of advocacy in the systems. One of the
principal problems and challenges of advocacy before the systems, at
least in the Inter-American and European systems, is that there is a
great tension going on right now that I imagine was quite evident in
the conversation this morning and will be this afternoon: the tension
between the demands of a system that seeks to do justice and provide
redress in every single individual case—and that therefore generates
the kinds of administrative problems that we have been dealing with
on an increasing basis—and a system that instead seeks to supervise
and promote human rights through more large-scale, structural, pilot
cases, certiorari type of review, impact litigation, and those kinds of
advocacy efforts that seek to solve large-scale or structural or systemic
problems through certain individual cases. How this tension is

216

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:163

resolved leads to differences in basic rules of procedure, in how
opinions and decisions are made and drafted, what kind of
implementation is necessary, and administrative questions about how
to handle backlogs of cases, and the standing of petitioners and so
forth. So, that it is a major area that needs to be dealt with.
But I would also like to stress that I think it is really critical that the
comparison between the systems not be limited to procedural,
institutional, and structural questions; that comparisons really go to
the normative, substantive content of different human rights
problems and areas and thus help us understand, as deeply as
possible, what the proper reach and content of the norms should
be—for example, freedom of expression, the protection of
minorities—whether indigenous groups or religious minorities—or
the standards for assessing the independence of tribunals and
procedural protections like due process and delay. Those kinds of
substantive applications of human rights norms are just a few
examples of ones with which our system has struggled, and is
struggling, or ones in which we have already developed some kind of
norms and processes. By that kind of exchange, I think the
deepening of the substantive understanding of the content of human
rights is really essential as well.
Again, I want to leave time primarily for question-and-answer and
discussion, so I will stop there and let Victor and Felipe add some of
the thoughts that they might have and, otherwise, simply take
questions and open it up to conversation.
******
Victor Abramovich: Simply, I would like to give my thanks to Dean
Grossman and the Washington College of Law for the invitation to be
here today. Due to time and because many issues have been raised in
previous panel discussions this morning, I know it would be
interesting to open the floor for discussion. That being said, I think
Paolo’s opening is sufficient and we should go straight to questions.
******
Paolo Carozza: Yes, I should have noted early on, in fact, that
although Victor and I can stay, as scheduled, until 2:30 p.m., precisely
because of the demands of our working meetings and so forth at the
Inter-American Commission, that Felipe, who has been here all
morning with you, is going to have to leave in just ten minutes.
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B. Discussion
Bahame Tom Mukirya Nyanduga: I am a member of the African
Commission which has followed closely the working relationship
between the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American
courts. I have a colleague, a judge of the African Court, who is also
attending. I think he will be one of the panelists this afternoon.
Currently, both the African Commission and the Court are in the
process of harmonizing our rules of procedure. We know the systems
are slightly different and this is the point I wanted to make;
particularly, when you mentioned the importance of looking at not
only the institutional relationship but also to try to see what we learn
in terms of the principles which are evolving in the two systems.
Here, I can say that from the African Commission perspective, and
as was mentioned earlier, our Charter provides for a possibility of
being inspired by the principles and instruments which have been
adopted universally all throughout the system. We always look to the
Inter-American system to see the kind of principles or the kind of
mechanisms that are being developed. And of the number of issues
which came up during the panel discussions this morning, the issue
of follow-up on implementation of recommendations is particularly
important in terms of understanding how the Inter-American system
has developed and how it is evolving to ensure that those
recommendations are implemented.
The point I want to raise or even to reiterate on what you have said
is the need for the two systems, notwithstanding the differences in
culture and background, to continue the exchange so that we are
able to see how we can work closely together and also to develop the
principles because, as we all know, we are interdependent and the
principles are universal.
******
Paolo Carozza: One of the things that struck me about that
comment is that the two particular areas that you have raised—the
question of institutional relations between the Inter-American Court
and the Commission and the procedures that flow from that, and the
question of how we follow up on recommendations or decisions, are
both very good examples of areas in which there is not a fixed
problem that is static in time. The way that the challenge has arisen
for us, I think, is precisely out of the fact that there is a dynamic
relationship between the institutions, for example, and it is very
different today than it was before the reforms of 2001 or when the
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Court was first established and the Commission first began to send
some of the cases to the Court. The existence of different kinds of
advocacy groups within civil society has changed the relationship.
The past rules of the Court that give greater access, direct access, to
the Court by the representatives of the victims has also changed that
relationship. The Commission’s own practices regarding when and
how and under what circumstances to send cases to the Court has
changed that relationship as well.
It is exactly out of the dynamism—the fact that it is changing all the
time—that we need to be constantly reevaluating it. That is why we
are engaged now with the members of the Inter-American Court in
an ongoing discussion about what the next stage of changes demands
and how we need to adapt again.
The same is true of questions of follow-up, and this is why it is
critical to be asking these questions across systems, because the kind
of follow-up that was necessary in the European system before the
great expansion to forty-seven states of the Council of Europe was
very different than it is today. The same is true, in a certain sense, in
the opposite direction with respect to the Inter-American institutions
where follow-up has a slightly different character and dynamic when
we are talking about doing so with respect to governments that, in
differing degrees, are democratically accountable as opposed to ones
that are simply criminal dictatorships. And so we need to learn from
you as well as you from us precisely because things are fluid all the
time.
******
Felipe González: There is a point I would like to raise that was
discussed at the prior panel, that it is important to consider the issue
of legal aid for victims. In fact, until a few years ago, the victims did
not have autonomy to litigate a case before the Inter-American Court,
so the representatives acted as advisors to the Inter-American
Commission. So it was the Commission which was financing the
litigation before the Court. Then the victims became autonomous to
litigate the cases. They cannot lodge a case but can act autonomously
once the cases have been lodged at the Court and, since then, there
has been this whole debate about establishing some system of legal
aid or a trust fund that would allow all victims to be adequately
represented at the litigation at the Court. And I think that it would
be important to learn about the ways that the other systems are
dealing with this and we have for years been trying to move forward
with this without much success.
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******
Victor Abramovich: I just want to add that I think the question about
the relationship between the Inter-American Commission and the
Court and how it works is an important question. I remember that
ten years ago, there was debate within the Inter-American system
about moving towards the European system—a judicialization of the
system. In other words, to leave the Court as the only protective
body. I think the recognition in this debate of the role of the InterAmerican Commission as a monitoring body above and beyond its
management of the cases, was important. It is important to the
system to have a judicial body accompanied by a quasi-judicial body
that can monitor the cases and at the same time oversee the situation
of human rights within the countries. The Commission is able to act
as a line of communication between the disputes and the structural
situation on the ground in the countries.
I think it is important to link the Inter-American system with the
African system in particular. At the time this discussion occurred at
the end of the 1990s there was a certain expectation about the
process of the transition to democracy in Latin America. There was
an expectation that democracy would alter the human rights
problems in the region. And I believe that there have been some very
important improvements in the region in terms of respect for human
rights, improvements in electoral systems, improvements in the
justice system, etc. However, the end of the democratic transition did
not bring with it stronger democracies, meaning that there continued
to be violations of human rights and structural problems which led to
violations of human rights. I believe that the function of the InterAmerican Commission to articulate its work with disputes to the
Court, as well as its monitoring work, continues to be key. I believe
that there are certain similarities with the functions carried out by the
African Commission.
What we are seeing in this process is a much greater role being
played by the victims. As Felipe González said, the Inter-American
Commission continues to carry out its work as before, while at the
same time adjusting to a greater participation of victims in the cases
before the Inter-American Court. But I do believe that it is important
to show this relationship between the disputes and the monitoring
work, and there are many examples of this. For example, with regard
to amnesty laws and countries going through the process of judicial
transitions, it is clear how the individual disputes and subsequent
jurisprudence created a foundation for the Commission’s monitoring
work. The disputes and the monitoring role of the Commission are
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intimately interconnected and the Commission carries out the
function of being the link between the two. I believe that is an
important historical precedent to the discussion we are having here
today.
******
Claudio Grossman:
I was a member of the Inter-American
Commission from 1994 to 2003. In my view, there are three historical
moments for the Inter-American system. The first was the fight
against dictators. The most important technique that the supervisory
system used in this period was not the individual petition or the case
system. When there are more than 20,000 disappeared persons in
Argentina, you cannot open an individual file for each and go
through all the procedures of submission, hearings, and so forth.
The sheer numbers make this task extremely difficult. In addition, a
case does not pre-judge its result. At that time, it was very important
to expose disappearances and other mass and gross violations of
human rights immediately, issuing country reports that would
authoritatively describe those international crimes. Accordingly, the
Commission attempted to visit countries and, whether it was allowed
or not, issue reports that became very important for the purposes of
delegitimizing dictatorships.
The second historical moment was marked by the legacy of
dictatorship, which included dealing with amnesty laws and freedom
of expression restrictions. During this period, the supervisory organs
resorted to a combination of means, utilizing country or situation
reports together with individual petitions. For the most part,
member states with elected governments made this possible because
they started to cooperate with the system by participating in the
different proceedings.
I remember when I was the President of the Inter-American
Commission in 1995, I reported that we had adopted—and were very
proud of—nine decisions. In 2001, there were over fifty decisions
issued. This shows important growth in handling petitions, bringing
about a transition from country reports to petitions, which became
the most important supervisory technique employed by the system.
The third historical moment was brought about by the need to
achieve social inclusion in the face of vulnerable groups in the region
such as indigenous populations, women, children, refugees, and the
poor. The existence of severe inequalities and deprivation constitute
a threat to democracy and open possibilities for demagogic reactions
that ultimately go against the human rights tradition. At this stage,
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the case system was supplemented by the expansion of
rapporteurships focusing on matters such as indigenous groups,
women, migrant workers, etc.
It is worth noting that these historical moments are not entirely
separated and, depending on the country, we see how components of
these moments overlap and we see the role that organ can play in
establishing priorities required to promote and defend human rights
in a given context. Taking into account the creative, committed,
and—allow me to say—unavoidable role that the organs play, I
believe that it would be desirable to increase the interaction between
the different systems so that they can learn from each other in
matters of jurisprudence as well as in the development of techniques
designed to enhance their contribution in a dynamic reality.
******
Paolo Carozza: Yes, that would be extremely helpful and, as one
indication of it, I think we have been benefited at the Inter-American
Commission and I like to think that my colleagues from the InterAmerican Court have been benefited at the Court by exactly that
exchange between Commission and Court.
And we have, in the secretariats of both, individuals who have
transferred from one of the institutions to the other and provide
invaluable experience as a result of that. You can only augment by
doing it across systems as well.
The only thing I wanted to come back to, without taking time from
whatever other questions there might be, is that I think Dean
Grossman’s tripartite analysis of the history is extremely useful and
important. I want to mention, arising out of that, the thought that
there may be a fourth period that is beginning now that has a lot to
do with what Victor was pointing out about the increasing awareness
of the structural and endemic weaknesses of the democracies in the
system. Even those countries that now have had democracies for a
period of time in the Americas are increasingly being faced with the
kinds of large-scale and intractable human rights problems that arise
out of widespread social exclusion in the region. And so, it can come
up in anything from systematic discrimination of certain segments of
the population to prison conditions, where you cannot just take one
case, two cases, two individuals and say, “Now we are going to solve
the entire problem of conditions of detention in the country.”
I think we are struggling with the need to adapt, once again, to a
new stage where we are combining some of the elements of the
previous stages and fashioning new hybrids, and it is very much an
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open struggle, I think, among us as to how we are going to do that
and we really need help.
******
Andrew Drzemczewski: On the cross-pollination point. Yes, indeed
this should be pursued more often, as we can learn a lot from one
another. I understand that, not so long ago, a senior staff member of
the Inter-American Commission’s secretariat spent a number of
months working in the registry of the European Court in Strasbourg.
I do not think there exist any intractable difficulties in
accommodating staff members in the respective institutions.
There is also, as you pointed out earlier, Paolo, the utility of
organizing regular formal or less formal meetings between courts.
Members of the European Court of Justice (the EU court based in
Luxembourg) regularly hold meetings with judges from the Court in
Strasbourg, and the President of the Strasbourg Court, Jean-Paul
Costa, has recently had meetings with representatives from the InterAmerican Commission, as well as the President of the International
Court of Justice, Rosalyn Higgins.
And please let me add a comment while we are on the topic of
learning from each other. With respect to this, we in Europe were in
a comfortable situation—in so far as the regional human rights
mechanism was concerned in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. The basic
premise of the ECHR was that we are all mature democracies with
human rights and when there are difficulties, the fine-tuning of legal
norms with respect to, for example, the freedom of expression, would
be carried out in Strasbourg. Rarely would issues of fact be disputed
in Strasbourg. But the situation has drastically changed with the fall
of the Berlin Wall, and the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and
the ex-Soviet Union. We now have, in the Council of Europe, major
human rights violations to deal with. Take, for example, the case law
before the European Court with respect to Chechnya. Problems
encountered are akin to those which confronted the Inter-American
Commission and Court in the 1970s and 1980s. You have a rich
experience of knowing how best to handle major human rights
violations, a case law from which we in Europe can learn. Was it not,
for example, the experience of the Inter-American human rights
bodies which inspired the Strasbourg Court to develop its important
case law on substantive and procedural violations of non-derogable
human rights?
I am sure that we, in the so-called mature
democracies of Western Europe and, in particular, the human rights
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monitoring bodies based in Strasbourg, still have a lot to learn from
you.
My next point is about the parliamentary dimension of the work of
the organization I work for. This is a unique feature of the Council
of Europe which, since its creation in 1949 has, as one of its statutory
bodies, the Parliamentary Assembly composed of parliamentarians
who have two hats: one, as parliamentarians who work in their own,
national parliament; and another one, as parliamentarians in our
Parliamentary Assembly. This Assembly of parliamentarians can play
a significant role in the human rights field. I will just give you one
example.
My chairperson of the Legal Affairs and Human Rights Committee
is Mrs. Däubler-Gmelin. That name may not mean much to you,
unless you are conversant in German political life. But the position
she holds, and the potential influence she has in her country, can be
considerable. This is a person who was Minister of Justice of
Germany for over four years, and is also a professor of law, presently
the president of the Bundestag’s Human Rights Committee in
Germany—not a small country. She, and persons like her, have
several former ministers of justice and interior in the Legal Affairs
Committee composed of eighty-four members that can have an
important say on the domestic political scene, and not least in the
manner in which human rights issues are dealt with in their
respective national legislatures. The parliamentary dimension is
missing in most, if not all of other regional human rights
mechanisms. One should not forget that state responsibility for
human rights violations is not the sole responsibility of a government,
the executive, coupled with that of actions taken by the
administration and the state apparatus, including the judicial branch.
There is also an important dimension of responsibility, often
overlooked by human rights activists, which has to be shouldered by
the state’s legislative organs. Just look at the influence that the
report on extraordinary rendition and secret CIA prisons in Europe
has had in the world—hitting the front pages of many newspapers—
which was prepared by Swiss Senator Dick Marty, the predecessor of
Mrs. Däubler-Gmelin as chair of the Legal Affairs and Human Rights
49
Committee.
49. For more information regarding the work of the Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights, see the Committee’s website at http://assembly.coe.int/
Main.asp?link=/Committee/JUR/role_E.htm. The website describes, for example,
the work undertaken by the Committee on the subject of respect for human rights in
the fight against terrorism. In the new international climate that has emerged since
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Committee has been at the forefront
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A final point. In the Committee of Ministers, which supervises the
execution of Strasbourg Court judgments, as explained by my
colleague Charlotte de Broutelles, if a case is blocked for more than
five years or if there is a major structural problem, our Parliamentary
Assembly’s Legal Affairs Committee—with the dual hat of
parliamentarians working in Strasbourg and in their own
parliaments—decided about seven or eight years ago—ex officio—to
seize itself of such cases and to help in the implementation process.
******
Victor Abramovich: I am not in any position to analyze the European
system, but it seems important to return to what Dean Grossman was
saying about different forms of judicialization and the process of
judicialization. If one looks at the decisions of the Inter-American
Court, even the very first decisions, I believe it has historically been a
tribunal that always made decisions and looked beyond the specific
case. And in the decisions, there are distinct ways to have an impact
regarding structural changes, such as in the cases of massive and
systemic violations. For example, the issue of measures calling for
institutional reparation that requires changes of regulations or
policies that go beyond the situation of reparations for the individual
in the case. There are many examples of this, such as the case The
50
Last Temptation of Christ v. Chile, where Chile was required to revise
its constitution to establish the prevention of prior censorship.
Beyond the individual case the reparations have a collective effect
and scope. Another way of saying it is, and the decision was very
strong, is the impact the decision has on the jurisprudence of
domestic courts. This impact is very clear, for example, regarding the
freedom of expression, procedural guarantees, amnesty laws, etc.
The Barrios Altos case had a direct impact, for example, on the
decisions regarding amnesty laws issued by the Argentina Supreme
Court. Another example of the collective impact that a decision in a
discrete case can have is the discussion regarding peace and justice in
Colombia.
Lately, I believe, as Paolo noted as well, there is a tendency in the
system to make progress regarding the treatment of collective cases
that have many victims. At times, there are many victims named on
the case and sometimes the victims are the communities, as in the
of the Assembly’s condemnation of all forms of terrorism. In its reports, the
Committee has insisted that terrorism can and must be combated effectively by
means that fully respect human rights and the rule of law.
50. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73 (Feb. 5, 2001).

2009] ADVOCACY BEFORE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES

225

cases of indigenous communities. I believe that it is important
because, beyond the role of the Inter-American Court as a tribunal,
the impact of the decisions go beyond the case and function also as
pressure in a way for the states to revise their regulations, practices,
and policies. And I believe this is important.
Now, the other question that I think is important to put into the
discussion is the issue of the 2001 reform. Was it a greater
judicialization or not? This is what I believe is part of the debate.
Without a doubt, the number of cases that the Inter-American
Commission began to send to the Inter-American Court as of 2001 is
greater. Before, between 1997 and 2001, there was an average of four
cases per year sent to the Court. From 2001 to 2007, there was an
average of twelve cases sent to the Court per year. One looks at those
numbers and could think that there is an increase in the quantity of
cases that are sent to the Court and a tendency for greater
judicialization of the cases. However, if one looks at the relationship
between the quantity of the cases that go to the Court and the
quantity of the petitions received by the Commission, the spread
remains the same. Between 1997 and 2001, one percent of the cases
were sent to the Court. The quantity of the petitions received by the
Commission during that timeframe were 450 to 500 petitions per year
and four of those per year were sent to the Court. That is less than
one percent. Between 2001 and 2007, the Commission received
around 1,200 petitions per year, and twelve of those were sent to the
Court on average per year. That is to say that even after the 2001
reforms, the percentage of the cases that were sent to the Court is
one percent of the cases that the system processes—which is to say
that I do not believe that there has been a movement towards the
judicialization of the system.
However, I do believe that it is very important for the InterAmerican Court, by way of collective reparations or collective cases,
to focus on the structural situation within the country aside from the
individual case. I believe that the function of the Court goes beyond
the victims of the individual cases. This would have a very significant
impact on the structural problems that we are seeing in the region at
this time.
******
Paolo Carozza: Both of the themes that Andrew raises I think are
really helpful points of comparison. When I came to the InterAmerican Commission, I came as a professor, as a scholar, not as
primarily an advocate or activist, although I had done some litigation
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in the Inter-American system. I was a teacher and my area of specialty
was much more the European system than the Inter-American system,
and most of my scholarly work has been on Europe not on the
Americas. And so when I came to the Inter-American system, as a
Commissioner, I came, really, in a certain implicit way with the
mental model of Europe dominant in my mind. My way of perceiving
the possible direction of the Inter-American system was by reference
to the European one, including Protocol 11 and the elimination of
the European Commission, which I had never really questioned until
that point as being the natural evolution of the way that regional
systems would move. And it was only after having experienced, in a
serious way, for a period of time, the additional non-judicial roles of
the Commission that I realized exactly what was now missing in the
European system.
So I think it is a decision that has had consequences today that I do
not imagine you, who are involved intimately in it, did not foresee in
the mid-1990s. And it has principally to do with the need to
accompany the judicial and legalistic protection of human rights with
other mechanisms that are primarily focused on politics, on
promotion, on what I think of, in the broadest sense, as pedagogical
approaches to human rights; the kinds of engagements with political
and legal and social actors that help to increase a knowledge and
acceptance and internalization of the norms and so forth. I think
that is critically missing now in the European countries. It is being
done by some institutions but there is not a center of gravity for those
things the way that there is in the Inter-American system.
That realization, I think, has certain implications for our own
system too. Because of the dual nature of the Inter-American
Commission, this quasi-judicial one that treats individual cases, and
also the more political and pedagogical and sort of larger role that it
plays through the other kind of supervisory tools, there is always a
question of how to maintain the proper balance between those two
things, especially in light of the fact that we are chronically and
critically short of resources. The fact that we are so short of resources
within the Inter-American system means that every decision to
allocate a certain number of resources towards the processing of
cases or away from the processing of cases and towards preparation of
other reports means, really, that you are sort of critically depriving
the other kinds of exercises from the same sorts of resources.
So right now we are facing a massive backlog of cases and a huge
delay, and it creates all sorts of problems: problems of equity,
problems of political relations, and so forth. And so there is a

2009] ADVOCACY BEFORE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES

227

massive amount of pressure and incentive to devote more and more
resources towards the processing of cases, the elimination of the
backlog and so forth. And the experience of Europe should be sort
of a warning to us that if we proceed in that direction without
sufficient attention to maintaining the strength of the other kinds of
tools that we have and that we need to maintain, the Inter-American
system could find itself in a serious imbalance as well over time.
******
Claudio Grossman: I do not think that simply the proportion of
cases being referred to a court tells the story.
******
Victor Abramovich: No, you are right. It is a little like what Paolo was
saying. Beyond the actual number of cases that are sent to the InterAmerican Court, the time the Inter-American Commission spends
working is very much concentrated in the dispute aspect of the cases.
Even as such, however, you can see in the last few years a series of
reports monitoring structural situations in the countries. I believe
that the key issue is how to coordinate the judicial work of the
Commission with the monitoring role of the Commission. I believe
that this is the main point. And a possible initial conclusion is that
the cases, and the quantity of cases that the Commission receives, act
as a sounding board for the problems in the region. It is not the only
diagnostic monitoring method, but it works as a sounding board for
these problems. And without a doubt, one of the main issues that
appears in all of the cases is the deficiency of the administration of
justice systems on the national level. If one looks back at the
Commission’s reports regarding the issue of access to justice, it is
clearly a central theme in the monitoring work of the Commission.
I believe that therein lies the strategic aspect of the work of the
system. How do we ensure that the jurisprudence of the InterAmerican Court and the human rights treaties are implemented at
the domestic level? At the internal level? How do we achieve
coordination and dialogue between the international system and
national judicial systems at the same time? I believe that the Court is
doing a great job with the higher courts of the countries in the
region. There are good improvements in several countries in the
region regarding the domestic application of international laws. Not
only regarding issues of amnesty laws, but in other respects as well. I
believe that this is a strategic aspect of the work of the system.
Figuring out how to strengthen the protection at the national level
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and the role of the national tribunals is key. This is why if one were
to look back into history, one would say that this is the central axis of
the monitoring work of the Inter-American Commission, which has
everything to do with the access to justice and the administration of
justice. In my opinion this is the underlying issue when you look at
the docket of cases and the majority of the states request an
exception due to insufficient domestic resources. The problem is not
a lack of resources, but rather the infectiveness of the judicial systems.
International protection will come with greater domestic guidance.
******
Paolo Carozza: Just to pick up on the second part of Andrew’s
comment in relation to what was said about the treaties—although I
think it is a great achievement that the treaty has succeeded in not
being treated like a constitution within the tradition of this
hemisphere, one of the costs, of course, is that it means that you do
have to find other mechanisms of adaptation of the system to the
needs. And the fact that we have a system that, unlike the European
system, does not have a strong political supervisory mechanism and
set of institutions and integration of regional parliaments with
national politicians and so forth is one of the things that we are
critically lacking. And so, in the absence of a protocol that would add
it but also carry the risk of opening up everything else, I think one of
the challenges that we face is figuring out what might be functional
equivalents, functional parallels to what exists in Europe that could
be developed without refashioning the whole structure of the
American convention and the institutions.
So now I am going to leave and let you struggle with these
questions all afternoon with one another because we do have to get
back to our sessions. But maybe, just by way of closing, I will say this:
I think it is worth reminding ourselves, periodically, that what all of
this enterprise is about, that we are all committed to, that we are all
here because we are interested in it and engaged in it is, at the end of
the day, the value—the inestimable value—of every human person.
That is what the whole premise of the human rights enterprise is.
And if it is not about that, then the whole thing collapses like a house
of cards at the end of the day. It just becomes one political
ideological project to be opposed by another one. So that does not
necessarily mean that the international system does have to proceed
through taking every single individual case and exploring it to its
end. Maybe it does but not necessarily. But I think we have to realize
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that the attraction of the individual cases in large part stems from
that, from this idea and this fundamental principle and desire to do
right by the person, every person; that one person’s injustice is
already too much.
******
Victor Abramovich: As has been raised here in this discussion, there
is a change regarding the issues—from massive violations to structural
problems that are related to violations of human rights. And I think
that therein lies the challenge that still exists for the system—how to
work with structural cases. I believe that there are improvements in
terms of thinking about collective reparations that go beyond the
case. I believe that there is an improvement in processing cases that
affect groups. Many times, states complain about the processing of
cases implicating groups of people, but these cases allow the system to
tackle structural problems—for example, cases regarding prisons or
indigenous communities. And I believe that another key issue
regarding structural issues of human rights violations is maintaining
the monitoring role of the Inter-American Commission such as the
visits it conducts, the coordination between monitoring, and the
actual cases themselves. I believe that this is an essential issue
because we leave the massive violations behind, but there continue to
be structural problems that affect the validity of human rights. Above
all, it affects groups or entire sectors of the population. Thank you.
IV.

PANEL 3: INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES FACING REGIONAL
SYSTEMS FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón

51

We will begin now with the final panel here at the Washington
College of Law. We are delighted to have here a very interesting panel
to discuss mainly what we have envisioned as the challenges of the
regional systems. You have heard a lot of information discussed in
the previous panels that I think is going to serve also as a basis for
some of the discussions that we are going to be holding in this panel.
So without saying anything else, I will present the first panelist,
Pablo Saavedra. Pablo Saavedra is the Secretary of the InterAmerican Court in San Jose, Costa Rica. More importantly, from my
51. Professorial Lecturer in Residence and Co-Director of the Academy on
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, American University, Washington College of Law.
Professor Rodriguez-Pinzon teaches courses in the fields of international law and
human rights law.
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perspective, he is a very good friend of our institution and a very
good friend of the human rights cause. He has been a very creative
force on the Inter-American Court, fostering many of the latest
improvements in that tribunal with the support of very dynamic
judges. He will present some of the challenges the Court has been
facing, and hopefully at the end, we will have enough time for
questions for him and his colleagues.
B. Pablo Saavedra

52

Thank you, Diego. First, I want to thank the Washington College of
Law and the MacArthur Foundation for the invitation. I think that
one of the challenges that we have for the future is that of achieving a
dialogue about the problems and the strengths of the three most
permanent regional systems for the protection of human rights.
From the perspective of the Inter-American Court, I want to point
out certain strengths and, on the other hand, certain problems that
exist. I first want to highlight the system of reparations of the Court.
I believe that one of the greatest contributions that the Court has
made to the case system is within the sphere of reparations. In each
specific case, the Court orders individual reparations, but also takes a
broad view by ordering structural reparations in order to address
underlying problems so that particular kinds of violations will not
reoccur. Accordingly, it is important that we ask whether the Court’s
judgments are being complied with, and that we address the
challenges that it is facing.
Specifically, regarding indemnifications, at the beginning of this
year we presented data that showed that eighty-one percent of
damage awards ordered by the Inter-American Court were paid by
the states, and some states are currently in the process of paying. I
believe that this figure reflects positively on the level of
implementation of the orders of the Court in that respect. The states
also comply with implementing reparations ordered by the Court in
which positive obligations are imposed, such as the construction of
monuments, the naming of streets, etc. Compliance has been
somewhat delayed, as can be seen from the Court’s supervisory data,
but the completion of these projects as guarantees of non-repetition
and measures of satisfaction is important. It should be noted that
when the Court has ordered public apologies or acts of public
reconciliation in a particular case, generally the act is officiated by
52. Registrar, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Organization of American
States. The views expressed are those of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Commission or the OAS.
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high-level authorities of the State in question. We have seen some
very significant examples of this, such as the public apology of the
President or Vice President of Guatemala.
I believe that the Court has made great advances and contributions
in ordering reparations that address structural problems with the aim
of avoiding future violations of the Convention. I would like to
briefly refer to some examples. One of them was mentioned this
morning:
limitations on amnesty.
Developments in the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court on this matter have been
53
influential. Since the case of Barrios Altos, amnesty laws have been
left without legal effect in that state. And this is not only in Peru.
The outcome of this case has served as a guide to the Argentine
Supreme Court and to the high courts of other states in the region.
Another example can be found in the case of The Last Temptation of
54
Christ v. Chile, in which the Court ordered the state to reform its
political constitution to remove censorship of cinematography, and
55
the state complied.
Through cases like this, the Court has
prevented similar cases from arising. Similarly, a law was recently
passed in Chile in compliance with another judgment of the Court
56
regarding access to public information. The President of Chile
asked legislators to pass a law that was in accord with international
standards in order to comply with the Court’s orders, since previously
57
no such law existed in Chile.
We also have many examples of cases involving indigenous
communities. For instance, a case arrived at the Inter-American
Court due to a structural problem in Nicaragua, specifically, that
there was no law that permitted the demarcation of the ancestral
58
territories of an indigenous community. The Court ordered, as a
measure of reparation, the enactment of a law setting forth specific
guidelines for this purpose, and this has allowed the implementation
59
of various processes of demarcation in Nicaragua.
Additionally,
there is a case against Costa Rica concerning freedom of expression
and the right to appeal a judgment to a higher court. Under Costa
Rican law, the only remedy available to challenge a criminal
conviction was the writ of cassation, and this remedy only allowed a
53. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001).
54. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73 (Feb. 5, 2001).
55. Id.
56. Case of Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151 (Sept.
19, 2006).
57. Id.
58. Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 136 (Aug. 31, 2001).
59. Id.
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limited review of the proceedings of courts of first instance. Thus,
the Inter-American Court ordered the government to adapt the laws
of Costa Rica to the standards of the American Convention on
61
Human Rights (American Convention). Costa Rica has since passed
a new law intended to bring its domestic legislation in line with
international standards.
There are many other examples where the Court’s jurisprudence
has had a great impact. For instance, the Court has had an impact on
the functioning of military tribunals, attempting to restrict the scope
of their jurisdiction so that it may be exercised only over members of
62
a state’s military for offenses that affect the military’s legal interests.
Here, I believe that we encounter the greatest challenge that the
Inter-American system faces: achieving a “jurisprudential dialogue”
between national and international tribunals. It is important, in
particular, that national tribunals engage in this dialogue and ensure
“conventionality” (convencionalidad) in their decisions. In other
words, when national courts are applying the law in a particular case,
they should not do so only from the perspective of domestic law, but
should also take into account the international treaties that their own
States have ratified. This, I believe, is one of the most interesting
processes taking place in Latin America in the last decade. We are
seeing very positive results, such as the incorporation of international
treaties and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court into the
decisions of the high courts of several states. National courts are
engaging in the trans-nationalization of the decisions of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights.
Actors within the Inter-American system face another important
challenge: strengthening the exigibility of “conventionality.” I
believe that the work of creating a dialogue between national and
international courts does not lie within these institutions alone, but
should be taken up by litigants within the system. They must demand
that national courts apply international standards and persuade
domestic judges to do so. I believe that, in this respect, the InterAmerican Court is working to fortify civil society and other actors so
that they may present these demands to domestic authorities.
I would also like to mention, as a side note, another challenge that
I believe is very important: how to incorporate public defenders, as
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Case of Gómez-Palomino v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 136 (Nov.
22, 2005); Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 134 (Sept. 15, 2005).
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emerging actors, into the system of Inter-American litigation. I use
the term “public defenders” to mean lawyers provided free of charge
by the state to anyone who does not have access to legal assistance. In
Latin America, eighty to ninety percent of all criminal defendants are
represented by public defenders who often serve to reveal the
problems with due process that exist in the region. We are currently
seeing the first cases brought by public defenders to the system. I am
referring specifically to cases in Guatemala and Argentina and other
countries, where state-employed attorneys have identified structural
problems and brought them before the Inter-American Court. For
example, death penalty cases against Guatemala were brought by
public defenders, and as a result of these cases, hundreds of other
63
cases involving citizens in the same situation have been resolved. I
believe that this work is crucial, particularly because it allows those
with few economic resources to access Inter-American justice. Thus,
providing public defenders with better training and greater access to
the Inter-American system is important.
I also believe that
ombudsmen need to play a fundamental role in the future of the
Inter-American system.
We are seeing many cases in which
ombudsmen use the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court in
order to resolve disputes. This has occurred, for example, in the
Federal District of Mexico and in other states.
These are some of the important challenges that the InterAmerican system is facing, but there are other significant problems
that must be confronted as well. One is the problem of universality:
not all of the countries in this hemisphere have ratified the American
Convention. Of the thirty-four states that are part of the OAS, the
Inter-American Court only has jurisdiction over twenty-one. In the
panel this morning, another participant said that it was necessary to
follow the European system’s example in creating a political body to
supervise compliance with the decisions of the Inter-American Court.
In my opinion, it will be impossible to do so within the CJPA until all
of the American states have ratified the American Convention.
Currently, if such a body were created, a group of states that have not
ratified the American Convention would be able to supervise the
compliance of those states that have ratified the Convention and
recognized the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court.
Furthermore, I believe that universality is a fundamental challenge
for the Inter-American system because the current situation of
63. Case of Raxcacó-Reyes v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 133
(Sept. 15, 2005); Case of Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 126 (June 20, 2005).
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inequality between the states creates inequality among the citizens of
the Americas, barring many from accessing Inter-American justice.
Finally, as long as some states do not ratify the American Convention,
the resources committed to the development of the system will be
inadequate.
The budgetary problem of the Inter-American system, which
includes both the Court and the Commission, is one that I always
mention at the forums that I attend. Only to present the issue,
because I believe Santiago Canton will talk about this problem from
the perspective of the Inter-American Commission, the InterAmerican Court today has the fewest resources of any international
tribunal in the world. The recently created African Court has a
budget that is twenty percent greater than that of the Inter-American
Court. This reflects somewhat the political priorities within the OAS,
where the discourse on the importance of the system is not
translating into contributions for its financing. Only after five or six
years of struggle were judges on the Inter-American Court able to
receive a monthly salary of $1,000 dollars. The budget of the Court is
$1,700,000 dollars, but this amount is not sufficient to fund all of its
undertakings. Today the Court subsists thanks to the support of
Spain and Norway and the voluntary contributions of some individual
member states of the OAS. Without this financial support, the Court
would be forced to severely cut the number of cases it hears and its
activities of supervision, education, and promotion. However, these
resources are not guaranteed in the future. I believe that many of the
problems of the Inter-American system stem from this issue. As long
as the system does not receive adequate resources in a consistent
manner, it will not be able to plan for the long term.
However, despite these challenges, the Inter-American Court has
become a well-respected institution among the states of the Americas
and among civil society after thirty years. It has achieved very positive
results in terms of states’ compliance with its judgments. And
through the reparations that it has ordered, it has been able to
provide victims with redress and has impacted both the jurisprudence
of national courts and domestic legislation. Thank you very much.
******
Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón: I think these remarks present us with some
issues that we will hopefully be able to discuss for our work regarding
the dialogue between the systems: issues such as the Fourth Instance
Formula of the Inter-American Commission versus the margin of
appreciation used by the European Court, which could also be very
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relevant to what is happening in the African system. This is a brief
reference seeking to provoke you in this regard.
We have the pleasure of having Santiago Canton, Executive
Secretary of the Inter-American Commission here with us today.
Santiago has also been a Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression of the OAS. Working in several capacities with the system,
he has made tremendous contributions to our region. Santiago has
been a big supporter of the Inter-American Human Rights Moot
Court Competition that we host at the Washington College of Law,
among many other human rights initiatives.
64

C. Santiago Canton

I would like to thank the organizers for the invitation, and I would
like to congratulate them for providing me with the opportunity to
discuss the different regional systems for the protection of human
rights with scholars, activists, and practitioners from all the regions.
There is a large vacuum at the international level concerning the
coordination among international human rights organizations. In
many aspects, international civil society organizations are more
coordinated than international institutions with supervisory authority.
This vacuum must be filled if we are to strengthen the protective
capabilities of these organizations. I believe that such coordination
should be under the umbrella of the UN High Commissioner’s
Office. However, in the absence of such coordination these
exchanges are more than welcome and needed.
In the short time I have, I will refer to what I consider to be among
the main challenges of the Inter-American system. In so doing, I will
refer also to what I consider to be the backbone of the system. Only
then can we understand the challenges we are facing.
In the Americas, the system for the protection of human rights is
sustained by four fundamental pillars. The first pillar is the
international instruments for the protection of human rights. The
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man—approved in
1948 just a few months before the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights—jump-started a process of developing international human
rights instruments that still runs today. Seven instruments have been
65
approved in the region and two more are in the working stages.
64. Executive Secretary, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Organization of American States. Previously, Mr. Canton was the OAS Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
65. The American Convention on Human Rights (1969); the Protocol on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or “Protocol of San Salvador” (1988); the
Protocol to Abolish the Death Penalty (1990); the Inter-American Convention to
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A second pillar is the international bodies created to supervise the
rights recognized in the international legal instruments. The InterAmerican system, modeled after the European system and similar to
the African model, is composed of two bodies: the Commission and
the Court. The Commission was created in 1959 and the Court in
1979. Today, the combined and complementary efforts of both
bodies have reached a level of development that has become essential
for protecting the rights of individuals all over the Americas and for
strengthening the rule of law in many countries in the region.
A third pillar is civil society. In the Inter-American system, civil
society has been the main engine that keeps the system active and
responsive to the needs of the people. Latin America’s civil society
became actively engaged with the Commission during the years of the
dictatorships in the Southern Cone.
Civil society found, in the Inter-American Commission, the last
and only recourse available to denounce the grave and massive
violations that were taking place. While all the doors in its countries
had closed, the Commission provided civil society its only
opportunity. And the Commission played a decisive role by visiting
the countries and preparing reports denouncing the violations to the
international community. Since those days, a mutually beneficial
relationship between the Commission and civil society has been
critical in shaping the Inter-American system as it is today. None of
the progress and results achieved in the protection of human rights
in the Americas can be understood without taking into consideration
this fertile relationship.
The fourth pillar is the states of the Americas. The states have
created the system, have drafted and approved the international legal
instruments, and have created the supervisory organs. Clearly, the
creation of the system comes together with the responsibility to
ensure that it works efficiently. The responsibilities of the states are
many, but I will focus mainly on four that I believe are critical.
First, the states have the responsibility of nominating the best
possible candidates for Commissioners and Judges. The importance
Prevent and Punish Torture (1985); the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture (1985); the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of
Persons (1994); the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women or “Convention of Belem do Para” (1994);
and the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities (1999). Complete texts are available
at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic.TOC.htm. The two instruments
discussed in these remarks are an American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples and a Convention against Racism and all Forms of Discrimination and
Intolerance.
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of this is obvious, but I would like to highlight that the independence
and autonomy of the Commission and the Court have been the main
reason behind the success of the system, and this depends a great
deal on the composition of the organs. Throughout the history of
the system, we have been, in general, very fortunate to have a good
composition in both institutions. However, it is also true that, many
times, the nomination of and voting for members of the Commission
and the Court are based on political considerations rather than on a
selection of the best possible human rights experts.
A second responsibility of the states is to ensure that the InterAmerican Commission and the Court have the resources needed to
efficiently fulfill the mandates given to them by the same states that
created them. Today, that is far from a reality. Approximately only
five percent of the OAS budget is allocated for the Commission and
the Court. It is shameful that the Inter-American system of human
rights functions principally with the financial support it receives from
external benefactors. Today, more than fifty percent of the resources
come from external donors, but those resources are still not sufficient
to comply adequately with all of our mandates. If the need for
resources is not resolved soon, it will be very difficult to maintain a
stable and efficient system.
The allocation of the OAS budget is a political decision. The
political will to strengthen the Inter-American system, expressed
consistently by the member states, should be followed by the concrete
action of redrafting a budget that has previously kept the percent
allocated to the human rights system at about five percent for more
than a decade even though the mandates and the number of
complaints it receives have more than tripled.
A third responsibility of the states is to ratify all the Inter-American
human rights instruments. Only eight countries have ratified all of
66
them. The need for ratification is particularly critical when it comes
to the Inter-American Convention. Without full ratification by all
member states, it will not be possible to have a system that equally
protects all people in the Americas. This means effectively denying
access to international justice to millions of people.
A fourth responsibility of the states is to comply with the decisions
of the Inter-American Commission and the Court. It simply does not
66. Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, México, Paraguay, Peru, Panamá and
Venezuela have ratified the seven Inter-American instruments of Human Rights. On
the other hand, there are ten countries that, after signing the American Declaration,
have not ratified any of the instruments: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize,
Canada, Cuba, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, and the United States.
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make sense to create a human rights system where the system is given
a mandate to receive and process complaints, given a mandate to
make recommendations and pass judgments, and given a mandate to
supervise compliance with the international legal instruments, yet the
states are not going to comply.
Compliance in the Inter-American system is moving in the right
direction, but it is still far from been fully realized. Let me first
mention some good examples of compliance.
Many Inter-American Commission cases have helped bring about
structural reforms within the states, enabling the defense and
protection of human rights for millions of people. A few examples
give a sense as to the magnitude of the Commission’s contributions.
In 1992, the Inter-American Commission was the first international
human rights body to determine that amnesty laws are a violation of
international human rights law. Specifically, the Commission ruled
that amnesty laws were a violation of the American Convention and
67
of the Declaration and should be left without effect.
These
decisions helped trigger a process that ended with similar Inter68
American Court decisions and eventually led to the derogation of
amnesty laws in Peru and Argentina, paving the way to end impunity
for rights violations of the past. This significantly contributed to the
process of strengthening the rule of law in the region.
Another essential contribution of the Inter-American Commission
has to do with the so-called leyes de desacato, or contempt laws, that
penalize the criticism of public officials. The Commission declared
these laws to be in violation of the American Convention on Human
Rights and recommended that all states repeal them. Today, at least
69
ten countries in the region have done so. I could mention many
other examples of significant advances, such as the repeal of an
article of the Constitution in Chile that allowed prior censorship; the
sanction of a new law against domestic violence in Brazil; the
significant reform of the military justice code in Argentina; and many
others.
Regardless of these examples that show the effectiveness of the
system, the numbers regarding full compliance show a different story.
67. IACHR, Report No. 28/92, Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309 and
10.311, Argentina, Oct. 2, 1992, available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/92eng/
Argentina10.147.htm; IACHR, Report No. 29/92, Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145,
10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374 and 10.375, Uruguay, Oct. 2, 1992, available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/92eng/Uruguay10.029.htm.
68. See Case of Barrios Altos, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001).
69. Belize, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama,
Paraguay, and Peru.
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For instance, I believe that the Inter-American Court has been able to
close no more than ten cases out of 110 that have been decided. This
is less than ten percent of compliance. The situation is very similar to
the Inter-American Commission. However, it is very important to
keep in mind that while full compliance is very rare, partial
compliance is becoming more and more the norm. For instance,
Pablo Saavedra, the Executive Secretary of the Court, said that eightyone percent of the monetary compensations have been complied
with. That is obviously an excellent figure. In addition, other forms
of reparations, like the recognition of responsibility, are also on the
rise.
However, a central aspect of the decisions and
recommendations has always been the realization of justice in each
individual case. This aspect is very far from being complied with.
Unfortunately, in this arena we have a long way to go.
I believe that compliance with the decisions is the principal
challenge down the road for the Inter-American system.
Unfortunately, compliance relies too heavily on the political will of
the governments to fulfill their human rights obligations. When
there is political will, compliance is easier to achieve. Without that
will, it is very difficult to obtain good results. That should not be the
case. We will be able to say that we have reached a good degree of
maturity in the Inter-American system when governments that do not
want to comply do so anyway—when they feel obliged to, either by
international or national law.
This is one of the areas in the field of international human rights
law, at least in the Inter-American system, where there is very little
development: national legislation to comply with international
decisions. Today, only three countries in the Americas have specific
regulations to comply with the decisions of the Inter-American
human rights bodies: Costa Rica, Peru, and Colombia. And even in
those three cases, the laws are far from ideal. I strongly believe that
this legal vacuum must be filled in order to ensure that political will
no longer is needed to fulfill the human rights obligations.
There are many other issues that I would like to share with you, but
my time has run out. I am very grateful, once again, to be here to
share with you some ideas and to discuss them openly with other
international institutions. These discussions can only strengthen our
work and make the ideals of human rights truly universal. Thank you
very much.
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******
Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón: Santiago, thank you very much. You
mentioned the importance of interaction between the national and
the international levels. I just want to call your attention to the InterAmerican experience regarding that subject. Civil society has played
a very important role in this hemisphere.
Now I invite to the floor Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz. We are
delighted to have you here. Mr. Ouguergouz is a judge of the African
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights in Arusha, Tanzania. He is also
a member of the African Foundation of International Law. He has
worked as Secretariat of the International Court of Justice for twelve
years in The Hague. He has extensive experience in international
public law, and he is currently the Father Robert Drinan Professor of
Human Rights at George Washington University Law School.
Additionally, he has written extensively. One of his most recent
publications is the book, The African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights, A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable
70
Democracy in Africa.
D. Fatsah Ouguergouz

71

Dear Dean Grossman, dear Mr. Fanton, dear commissioners and
judges, dear colleagues, dear ladies and gentleman, Mr. Chairman of
the panel. I first wish to say that I am very pleased and honored to be
here today sitting on this panel and participating in this conference.
If I am not mistaken, the African Court of Human and Peoples’
Rights is the youngest of the institutions and bodies which are
represented here today. It is also the lesser known of those
institutions and bodies. I would even say that it is unknown, both
inside and outside the African continent.
The African Court, therefore, never misses a chance to enhance its
visibility. Visibility of the Court is actually one of the current major
changes that the Court is facing, and invitations to participate in such
events are greatly contributing to popularizing the existence and the
activities of the Court, which is the first judicial body ever established
on the African continent. I wish, on behalf of the Court and also in
my personal capacity, to thank the organizers of this conference, in
70. FATSAH OUGUERGOUZ, THE AFRICA CHARTER OF HUMAN & PEOPLE’S RIGHTS: A
COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA FOR HUMAN DIGNITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA
(2003).
71. Judge, African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. The views expressed
are those of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect those of the African Court of
Human and Peoples’ Rights.
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particular Dean Grossman from American University, as well as Mr.
Jonathan Fanton from the MacArthur Foundation, as well as the
other participating organizations and sponsoring organizations.
I have listened very carefully to all the previous speakers, the
learned speakers, either this morning or this afternoon, and they
were all dwelling about the issue of compliance and implementation
and decisions of their respective bodies. I am afraid that I cannot do
the same thing. The African Court has so far not completed the
examination of one single case, so I decided to give you a brief
overview of the challenges that the African system is facing and, of
course, the African Court itself, which is a part of the African system.
Before turning to the challenges, I should say some words about the
Court and its achievements. Most of you might indeed not be very
familiar with the African Court.
So briefly speaking, the African Court is composed of eleven
members. The judges are working on a part-time basis, as in the
Inter-American system. However, in the African system, the President
is working full-time, unlike the Inter-American system. The first
members of the bench had been elected in January 2006 and we were
sworn in July 2006. The Court has now existed for a little bit more
than two years. In two years, we have already held eleven sessions—
ten ordinary sessions and one extraordinary session—but I must say
that all the sessions were extraordinary because of the interest and
challenge of launching a new body. The seat of the Court is in
Arusha, Tanzania.
One thing that I should stress, one main feature of the African
Court, is that the Court has been given a very broad jurisdiction both
in its contentious function and advisory function; very broad
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Court actually extends far
beyond the control of the implementation and the application of the
sole African Charter to embrace all other relevant international
human rights instruments. It is Article 3 of the Protocol which
provides for this very broad jurisdiction.
Turning now to the achievements of the African Court during the
last two years, I will be very brief. The main achievements are the
following: the Court has prepared its budget for the year 2007 and
2008. And I should mention that the budget of the Court is rather
consistent, rather high. It is about $8 million dollars for 2008. By the
way, the budget of the African Commission was raised at the same
time. One of the first major tasks of the Court was to negotiate the
budget with the African Union’s political bodies. This negotiation
was rather successful.

242

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:163

The second main achievement is the drawing-up of a registry
structure. We had to build up a registry, so we had to fight also with
the African Union political bodies in order to get the structure of the
Registry approved. We got an authorization to hire about forty-six
staff members, which is high. We asked for seventy-six staff members,
and we got more than half, which is rather good. The process of
recruitment of this staff is already completed. However, we do not
have office space to accommodate them. That is why we have only
about half a dozen staff members within the premises of the African
Court so far.
The other important issue is the drafting and the negotiation of a
headquarter agreement with the government of Tanzania. This was
also a very complex exercise, and it has been successfully completed.
Last, but not least, the Court has achieved the drafting of its rules
of procedure—of its Rules of Court. I would say that the drafting of
the Rules of Court was the most time consuming and difficult activity
conducted by the Court so far during its first years of existence. I
should also underline that this drafting exercise has not been fully
completed. The rules that we have adopted this last June have,
indeed, an interim character. They have been adopted on a
provisional basis only. We are waiting to hold some talks with the
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights in order to
harmonize our rules with theirs.
Talking about the Rules of Court, I think it is a very good transition
to shift to the issue of challenges. There are three major challenges
that the African system is facing. In dealing with these three
challenges, the ability of the Court varies. As far as the first challenge
is concerned, the Court can do a lot. As far as the second challenge
is concerned, the Court cannot do much. But as far as the third
challenge is concerned, the Court can do nothing.
I turn now to the first challenge. The first challenge, and I would
say the most crucial and important one, is to make the African Court
and the Commission work together. Now that the African Court has
been launched, it indeed needs to be fastened, to be linked in an
efficient and coordinated way with the one-tier existing system so far.
That is, essentially, the African Commission. This is a rather sensitive
operation which needs to be carried out very carefully. I would
compare this operation with the docking of an American or Russian
spacecraft to the International Space Station, which never goes
without any technical complications. Why is the docking of the Court
to the Commission a sensitive operation? Because contrary to the
establishment of the other regional conventions—the Inter-American
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system as it exists now and the European system before the
convention—the protocol establishing the Court does not provide for
detailed provisions concerning the relationship between the African
Commission, on the one hand, and the African Court, on the other
hand. The Inter-American Convention provides for very specific
provisions for the interaction between the two bodies, and so did the
ECHR before its amendment by its Protocol No. 11.
The protocol establishing the African Court does not provide for a
precise articulation between the two bodies. It contains one single
provision which is entitled, “Relationship Between the Court and the
Commission.” But the provision is hollow; it just says that the Court
complements the protective activities of the African Commission.
Later on, I can dwell on those relationships, but what I should say
right now is that contrary to the European and Inter-American
systems, where the relationship between the Court and Commission is
a one-way relationship—from the Commission to the Court mainly,
except maybe for provisional measures—the relationship between the
African Court and the African Commission as it is now provided for
by the protocol, is a two-way relationship: from the Commission to
the Court and from the Court to the Commission. So it is a very
interesting and synergetic kind of relationship. There is a lot of
potential for the relationship between the Court and the
Commission. A meeting with the African Commission has been
planned for the discussion and harmonization of the Rules of the
Court and of the Commission.
The second challenge the African system is facing is that of access
to the Court. Now that the African Court is one of the two important
organs of the African system, the main issue is access to the Court.
To be more specific, I would say access to the court by NGOs and
individuals. There are indeed four kinds of entities which can access
the court: the African Commission itself, the state parties to the
protocol, African intergovernmental organizations, and—on an
optional basis—individuals and NGOs. So out of fifty-three member
states of the African Union which are also parties to the African
Charter, only twenty-four states have so far ratified and are parties to
the protocol. But out of these twenty-four states, only two states have
accepted the optional jurisdiction of the Court to entertain claims
from individuals or NGOs. Two states only: Burkina Faso and Mali.
So the challenge now is for the Court to open up access to its
jurisdiction. But the Court cannot do much in this field. It is a
matter of campaigning, of promotional work, and the Court is not
really equipped to conduct these kinds of activities. This is more the
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role of the civil society through the NGOs or such organizations like
the African Commission, which are very keen on promotional work.
Maybe the Commission can help us to publicize and to lobby civil
societies and governments in order to ratify the protocol more
extensively and open up the access to the individuals by filing the
special declaration under Article 34, paragraph 6, of the Protocol.
The third challenge that the African system is facing is the most
difficult one, and for which the African Court cannot do much. This
challenge relates to the merger of the African Court of Human and
Peoples’ Rights with the Court of Justice of the African Union.
In a nutshell, in 2004, African heads of state decided to merge two
different courts: the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights,
whose protocol already entered into force, and the Court of Justice of
the African Union, which was a court established by a 2003 protocol
that did not enter into force at that time and which is still not in force
today. The Court of Justice of the African Union has more or less the
same jurisdiction as the Luxembourg European Court of Justice.
During the last summit held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt in July 2008,
the protocol on the merger of the two courts was adopted by the
Assembly of Heads of State of the African Union. It needs about
fifteen ratifications in order to enter into force, which might take a
couple of years or more.
So this new merged African Court would consist of sixteen judges
working part-time, and of two sections: one dealing with general
legal matters and the other dealing with human rights issues. This
court will also have a very, very broad jurisdiction, and this is where
the problem lies. This Court will indeed have the combined
jurisdiction of the European Court, of the Court of Justice of
Luxembourg, of the International Court of Justice, and of the UN
Administrative Tribunal. In other words, the new merged African
Court will have jurisdiction for human rights issues, general
international law issues, constitutional issues within the African
Union, and it will also be authorized to entertain appeals from the
staff of the African Union. All this would be taken care of by sixteen
judges working part-time.
So the challenge would be to dock this merged court with the
existing system when the protocol will enter into force. So remember
the spacecraft and the International Space Station, with the
difference that the spacecraft is twice as big as before—twice bigger
than the existing African Court. And there are, of course, many
concerns as far as this docking is concerned, since the judges of the
current African Court, the bench of the current Court, including
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myself, will be “resigned”—or, in other words, will be dismissed. So
there will be a totally new court which is going to be established,
creating some very important and crucial issues of judicial legacy.
The European Court, as I understand it, has a docket of about
100,000 applications so far. I do not have a precise figure for the
Inter-American Court, but I gave you already the sharp figure for the
African Court: zero cases, none. My main concern for the next few
months or years is that the Court will be seen as doing nothing. This
might undermine the credibility of the African Court and the
expectation of the African populations in this matter. Let me remind
you, and I speak here under the control of my friend, Commissioner
Bahame Nyanduga, that the African Commission during its first years
of existence has been very harshly criticized because it was apparently
regarded as doing nothing. Actually, the Commission was also
struggling with a lot of organizational issues. It was doing many
things underground. It was, in a way, fertilizing the soil. One
question from this morning asked, “What did the African
Commission do during these last twenty years?” I would say, even if
you do not see any flowers or any trees, the Commission has played a
very important role. It has fertilized the African soil. It has created,
or tried to create, a human rights culture on the African continent.
For my part, I was very sympathetic with the African Commission,
and I used to compare this body to the character from the Greek
mythology: Sisyphus and his famous rock. And I used to say that, like
Sisyphus, the Commission was not rolling for nothing, but was in fact,
flexing her muscles. I hope that this will prove true as well for the
African Court, and that even though we do not have any cases so far,
we might be able to do lots of work which will prepare and pave the
way for future cases to be brought before the Court. Thank you very
much for your kind attention.
******
Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón: Finally, we are inviting to the floor an
expert on the European system, Mr. Andrew Drzemczewski.
Interestingly enough, I remember fifteen years ago when I was
studying for my master’s degree and working with a group of young
colleagues, including my friend Claudia Martin, in a human rights
interest group. We were publishing one of the first issues of the
Human Rights Brief, a Washington College of Law publication. My
colleagues researching the European system found that one of your
papers was one of the most interesting and challenging essays
regarding Protocol 11 of the European Convention. Therefore, Mr.
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Drzemczewski has been for me and my colleagues a very important
reference, regarding the practice of the European human rights
system. So we are institutionally and personally delighted to have you
here.
72

E. Andrew Drzemczewski

My title in this pamphlet is, Andrew Drzemczewski, Head of
Secretariat, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the
Council of Europe. An introductory remark and then three points.
The introductory remark is that, in effect, I am the head of the
Secretariat of the Committee of Legal Affairs & Human Rights of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council. During the break, I
explained we have the Council of Europe, created in 1949 by statute.
That statute describes two organs. On the one hand, there are the
committee ministers—foreign ministers represented by ambassadors
in Strasbourg. On the other hand, there is the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, which is much more important
than initially meets the eye because of the dual role of
parliamentarians and their possible influence on the domestic plane.
In this respect, they are unlike, for example, the European
Parliament, which is in a different category.
It is worth pointing out that the Legal Affairs Committee has
eighty-four parliamentarians. But what is probably more important,
is that the parliamentary assembly played a key role and was the
political motor in creating the European Convention on Human
Rights and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture.
It has an enormously important political role to play. And tied to
this, the assembly also has an important role because the assembly
parliamentarians elect judges to the European Court of Human
Rights. And before they are elected, they are interviewed—inconfidence, in-camera discussions—by a subcommittee of the Legal
Affairs Committee. Over the last two years, the parliamentary
assembly has rejected, six times, lists of three candidates provided by
the government. There is an element of political credibility and
status—a judge must have the required professional qualifications
and experience to be elected to the Strasbourg Court. The Assembly
will reject lists when candidatures are considered not to be up-to73
standard, not providing the Assembly with a real choice.
72. Head of the Secretariat of the Legal Affairs & Human Rights Committee of
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France.
73. For recent developments, see Eur. Consult. Ass., Nomination of Candidates
and Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights, Doc. No. 11767
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My first of the three points. The European Court of Human Rights
is a victim of its own success. We tend to say that in Strasbourg.
Perhaps, if you bear in mind the subsidiary element of what is meant
to be at Strasbourg, it is the member states which have not sufficiently
put their house into order in order to prevent potential applicants
from coming to Strasbourg. The situation within Strasbourg, at the
European Court, is obviously serious.
A few statistics. In the first nine months of this year, after
September 30, the European Court has nearly 95,000 cases pending.
In the first nine months of this year, the Court registered
approximately 37,500 applications. During the same period, the
Court has rendered around 22,000 judgments or decisions; in effect,
a rhythm of 30,000 per year. The backlog is growing. In the last nine
months, the backlog has grown to 15,500. That is about 1,700 per
month. To aggravate the situation, over the last two months, the
Court has received more than 2,800 applications from South Ossetia
in Georgia. And, I must not forget the interstate case of Georgia
against Russia.
The European Court has done extraordinary work here. The
number of judges has grown from forty-two, forty-three, to now fortyseven. What is probably more important is that, with respect to the
number of judgments and decisions in the ten years since Protocol 11
has come into effect, the Court has multiplied its work eight-fold. At
the same time, the Court has tripled its Secretariat, which now stands
at just over 620 staff members. And here again, forget about the
Court for a moment. If one talks about execution of judgments,
there is a judgment of the court that needs to be executed. What
Charlotte de Broutelles mentioned, which many of you possibly have
not noticed, there is a section of people who help in the execution of
court judgments within the Secretariat. They have nearly 7,000 cases
pending with respect to execution before the Committee of
Ministers—implementation if you like, rather than execution. And
the staff members, if I am not mistaken, are twenty-three, six of whom
are temporary.
My second point: the Court’s future. I can pose this as a question:
the European Court, as was mentioned by Paola Carozza in our lunch
discussion, is really sitting between two stools, is it not? Will the
(2008),
available
at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/
WorkingDocs/Doc08/EDOC11767.htm, and Eur. Consult. Ass., Nomination of
Candidates and Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights,
Res. No. 1646 (2008), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/
Documents/AdoptedText/ta09/ERES1646.htm.

248

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:163

Court actually collapse? By sitting between two stools, will it fall apart
and not succeed, having in mind the statistics I just provided you
with? Now, the balancing act, as was discussed at the lunch break, is
self-evident. On the one hand, you have the right of individual
petition.
The right of individual petition—the individual’s
procedural and substantive right on the international plane—is an
achievement which we cannot give up. To give this up would be
unacceptable. On the other hand, it is a quasi-constitutional court,
whereby it has to maintain constitutional European standards on the
international plane.
The question is, should it do both? Should it not? We have had
ideas whether or not we should have the system of the U.S. Supreme
Court, the docket-choosing, the certiorari system, the German
constitutional court (a system, basically, of the right of individual
complaint and norm control). We are now brainstorming as to how
to get out of this difficult situation. We do not have any miracle
solution. We have to maintain, on the one hand, the right of
individual petition and, on the other hand, the constitutional role
that the Court plays. It is a function which is hybrid and, as far as I
am concerned, and I hope my colleague agrees with me, is tough but
needs to be somehow maintained. But this is what has made the
success story of the Council of Europe, and it is not for us to jump
onto one bandwagon forgetting about the important need for a
judicial determination with respect to individual applications,
because this is what it is all about: an individual’s human rights.
One word about the problem of Protocol 14. Protocol 14 was
introduced a few years back to speed up the system—a single judge
would replace a committee of three judges in determining obviously
inadmissible applications, and a committee of three judges to take
the place of seven when cases were obviously “manifestly wellfounded” and concerned well-established case-law. The Russians are
blocking it because the Russian State Duma has not allowed for the
ratification of the Protocol 14. It has been blocked. The system
would have allowed the Court to accelerate its work between twenty
and twenty-five percent had Protocol 14 already gone into effect a
couple of years ago. We are in a difficult situation. Some would say
this is the make or break situation concerning Protocol 14. Our legal
committee’s next meeting will be in Moscow on the 10th and 11th of
November, in a few weeks’ time. During that meeting, we will be
speaking with the Legal Committee of the Russian State Duma, and
we will see to what extent the State Duma is prepared to reconsider
its view as to whether or not Protocol 14 should be ratified.
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My third point: international challenges in the wider context.
There are many, but I will focus on two or three of them. The first
one is the European Union and the protection of human rights. You
have the European Union of twenty-seven member states as opposed
to the forty-seven Council of Europe member states. It has an
enormous bureaucracy. It has exceptional, in effect, state powers
which are not subject to any international judicial human rights
control mechanism. The Lisbon Treaty envisaged accession of the
European Union to the European Convention of Human Rights.
This should still be very much a priority so that we have a
constitutional system which is covered by a human rights regional
mechanism in Europe.
Regarding innovations, especially with respect to the Strasbourg
Court case law and the impact of the Court’s leading judgments in
the domestic law of member states, I will mention two which have
been discussed today: pilot judgments and ensuring the execution of
the Court’s own judgments.
Pilot judgments. This procedure has, in effect, indirectly extended
the benefits of the findings of the Court to all the persons in similar
situations. We say, “Great. Why not copy it? Why not move on?” Let
me introduce a few complications.
These are significant developments, but we must beware of certain
things about this procedure. It needs fine tuning. For example, who
determines whether there exists a systemic problem? The Grand
Chamber, surely. But the Grand Chamber is at the end of the line;
there is also the Chamber. The Grand Chamber must determine
whether or not to come out with a pilot judgment. There may be
other cases which deserve similar treatment.
Obviously, this
procedure deals with complex issues based on a single case and does
not necessarily reveal other related aspects in similar, but not
identical cases. Hence, pilot judgments may only, in certain
instances, partially identify systemic problems. In the mean time,
other related types of cases will be frozen and not looked into,
further delaying the determination by the Strasburg Court of their
cases. So yes, pilot judgments may well be considered as a partial
answer to the Court’s workload, but, in reality, the situation is not so
simple.
A word about the execution of Strasbourg Court judgments. In
effect, it is the committee ministers who supervise the execution of
the Strasbourg Court judgments. To a certain extent, our European
Court of Human Rights is always known to make declaratory
determinations, and it is up to the committee ministers to supervise
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the execution of Court judgments. In the case Assanidze v. Georgia,
the Court in effect gave the state no discretion—you have to let the
person out of prison, there is no issue here. In effect, is this
judgment not usurping or going into areas strictly within the
competence of the committee ministers?
The impact of the court judgments case law, sometimes termed as
Grand Chamber Judgments of Principle of precedential value, not to
say, erga omnes effect. Article 46, paragraph 2 specifies that only the
state with respect to which there is a judgment by the Court is bound
by that judgment. But to what extent are all state parties bound by
such judgments of principle? Let me refer you to the cases Golder v.
75
United Kingdom, regarding right of access to the Court, and
76
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, regarding the binding nature of
interin measures. It is in the Rules of Procedure of the Court, not in
the actual Convention. Let me also refer you to the cases Marckx v.
77
Belgium, regarding children born out of wedlock, and Hirst v. United
78
Kingdom, regarding prisoners’ rights to vote in elections. These
cases and their holdings provide food for thought. It is de facto erga
omnes. De jure, it cannot be. Very strange situation. And we had some
interesting comparative elements on this with respect to case law.
You may recall the Argentina Supreme Court taking into account the
Barrios Altos case from the Inter-American Court.
And last, but not least, I want to comment on the Reform Package
which was mentioned by my colleague, Charlotte de Broutelles. It is
too easy, in a nutshell, to say it is for Strasburg to deal with this matter
itself. Surely, let us throw the ball back into the court of the
countries concerned. It is for their judiciary to take into account the
case law of the Strasbourg Court. It is for the countries themselves to
help out. And if you look to the new aspect of Strasburg case law,
there is a small handful of countries with massive systemic problems
generating a large proportion of total applications, you have a
situation where twenty-six percent of all applications are brought
against Russia. Nearly sixty percent of all cases pending before the
Court of Strasburg relate to Russia, Romania, Ukraine, and Turkey.
Should we not concentrate on those rather than try to reinvent the
wheel and create a protocol 16, 17, or 18 in Strasburg? Is it not really

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

App. No. 71503/01, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 (2004).
18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1975).
App. Nos. 46827/99 & 46951/99, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (2005).
31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 330 (1979).
(No. 2), 681 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
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the duty of the member states to deal with those cases? That would
clear up a substantial backlog straight away.
One problem is that the human rights instruments, on the one
hand, are the common denominator in the European context, while
at the same time, the Convention is a living instrument. To what
extent does one take into account the Court’s case law and a merging
consensus in Europe on certain matters. For example: rights of
homosexuals. This had tremendous impact in that context.
A few more examples. In the United Kingdom, there is the
Human Rights Act of 1998, which says that the domestic court must
take into account the case law of the Court.
The German
Constitutional Court has in effect said that the case law must be taken
into account. The Russian Constitutional Court has recently decided
to set up a special ECHR case law research team in its own registry.
The UK Parliament has the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Human Rights, which verifies draft legislation and legislation and its
compatibility with the Convention and Strasburg case law. Over the
last few years, it has taken into account all cases where the UK has
been found in violation and every year methodologically looks
through these cases in a way in which a parliamentary body should.
Similarly, in the Netherlands, the government agent before the Court
makes a report to the government. Our parliamentarians in the
Legal Affairs Committee from the Netherlands insisted that that
report go public. And now, the justice committees of both houses of
Parliament in the Netherlands are actually provided on an annual
basis information concerning where the Netherlands has found
violations. More importantly, the committees are provided with case
law of court, which may have legal importance with respect to the
Netherlands, with respect to case law from other Contracting State
Parties. As a result, these bodies can short circuit and put right
things, not waiting for the next ten years when applicants seek justice
before the court. Thank you.
F.

Discussion

Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón: Now we are going to open the floor for
questions and comments from all of you.
Let me begin by making a couple of comments and by asking
questions for all of you. It was mentioned that there have been very
interesting practical measures adopted by some of the organs in the
human rights regional systems. For example, it was mentioned that
the African Court has permanent judges. Is that desirable? Would
that be an interesting feature for the Inter-American system to adopt?
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Another question. Some international organs use the Internet to
stream video to broadcast public hearings live around the world.
Would that be a desirable practice for the Inter-American Court?
What are the limitations for the use of this type of technology? I
simply ask about your reactions to these very specific features of
several regional systems that could help other systems improve their
proceedings and disseminate their work with relatively low budget
technology.
******
Pablo Saavedra: Thank you, Diego. With respect to the first
question of whether it is necessary to have permanent judges, like a
permanent court, I think it is a bit of what we discussed earlier. It is
first important to consider the sort of resources necessary for the
Inter-American Court and the Commission and then decide priorities
based on that. This can be one of the priorities. After having
listened to the questions of the two panelists from Europe and Africa,
I come out a bit more depressed because the African court started
with $2.2 million three years ago, and today they have $8 million. We
have been in existence thirty years and recently reached $1.7 million.
The European system is very interesting. As we just saw, they have
twenty-five percent of the budget of the European Council. We just
saw the Court and the Commission together have four percent of the
budget of OAS. That is, in total, $5 million. The European Court
has, more or less, € 50 million. We can see the difference that exists,
I think, and we need to look at the priorities and necessities that are
most urgent for the system. It could be the judges, but we can look to
see if other necessities might be more urgent. For example, the
court, after thirty years, has twelve lawyers, and we have seen that the
African system has forty-six lawyers and the European system has
hundreds of lawyers. They, therefore, are two different realities and
that is why I think it has to be prioritized after an analysis of
resources.
With respect to technology, I think we need to celebrate the
success the Court has had in the last several years. In the last several
years, I think we have had success in promoting the activities of the
Court that have been most important. We should celebrate these
periods of success for the Court with public hearings, especially in
San Jose and Costa Rica. I think this has had a great impact because
it has allowed the Inter-American system of human rights to get
closer to the citizens of the countries and especially to the authorities
of the states. It has created a new dynamic of dialogue, and there is
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now greater knowledge. With technology, I think we are on the right
path, but from the point of view of the Court, we have to be careful
with witnesses so that they are not too exposed, for themselves, but
also for reasons of security. The new reality of these cases is that
access may be gained through technological means, like television
and the Internet, etc.
******
Santiago Canton: Two things I want to talk about in light of Diego’s
comments. One is the decision made approximately one year ago to
transmit live the hearings of the Inter-American Commission. They
are all public and transmitted via the web. We have been receiving
very positive feedback regarding this new experience.
The
webcasting of the hearings are being utilized by universities and
NGOs for training lawyers and human rights activists all over the
region and the world.
Another comment I would like to highlight again in light of
something Andrew said is the great importance of the independence
and autonomy of the Inter-American Commission. As I said before,
the independence and autonomy of the Commission has been crucial
in the development of the organization. Over the last few years, two
Commissioners resigned from the Commission due to their
involvement in politics in their countries. One case involved the
acceptance of a ministry position, and, in the other, the participation
in a political campaign helping a presidential candidate. These
decisions have only reinforced the importance that the Commission
gives to its independence from any government activity. And with
that, I am very sorry, but I am going to have to leave to go back to the
sessions of the Commission.
******
Audience: My first question is directed to the Treasurer of the
African Court. What impact do you think the future Court of Justice
and Human Rights will have on the protection of human rights in the
region? I mean, is this a step forward or a step in terms of giving
access to the victims in terms of improving the effectiveness of the
regional system human rights protection? My second question is
actually an observation. I have heard comparisons between the InterAmerican system and the European system on whether there should
be a commission acting as a filtering mechanism to reduce case load,
and suggestions that perhaps the Inter-American system is facing less
serious case law problems thanks to the fact that it has a commission.
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I have a problem in understanding that because I think that with or
without a Human Rights Commission, the European system is still
facing a similar and not such a different amount of cases than it is
receiving now. Secondly, if that is the case, why has the European
system been so hesitant in creating a separate filtering body within
the court itself to solve the problem?
******
Fatsah Ouguergouz: It is a very difficult question actually. The
establishment of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights: is it
a step forward or a step backward? I would say yes, that it is definitely
a step forward. It is indeed a judicial body which has the potential to
back the African Commission and strengthen the whole African
system. Its decisions are binding, but it is too early to predict what
would be their impact on the African states.
With respect to the merged court, I would not say that it is a step
forward for sure. I only hope that it is not a step backward. This
merger, if it were done properly, could have been—I would not say, a
success—but not such a bad thing for the continental judicial system
of Africa. The African continent is a continent which now has the
greatest numbers of international courts. There are about seven
regional (or sub-continental) courts on the African continent, plus
the existing African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights and the
African Court of Justice, which is not yet established.
Seven years ago, the African states were already talking about a
merger of the two courts, but the idea was rejected. The idea was reintroduced only three years ago, in July 2005, with no preparation—
out of the blue, I would say. So now my concern is that this future,
merged court, which has four kinds of jurisdiction, might not be able
to deal efficiently with all the cases that involve issues ranging from
border delimitation, use of force, issues of sovereignty, to African
Union constitutional issues—I mean, interpretation, application, and
implementation of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, staff
appeals, and human rights.
The African Court, which exists now and on the bench of which I
am sitting, has already a very broad jurisdiction in the field of human
rights, and there are already very complex being raised. The Court is
at its early stage of existence. But there are very serious risks of
forum shopping and possible fragmentation of the case law that
could be raised in the near future. The future court will also have to
deal with this issue of forum shopping both in Africa and outside of
Africa. Indeed, in Africa, the states have the choice. They can go to
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the African Court, but they can also choose to go to other forums in
their regions—the various regional courts. They can also decide to
go to the Human Rights Committee, for example, or other UN treaty
bodies.
Forum shopping and fragmentation of the case law are thus
important issues. But I would not dwell too much on the importance
of the African Court. The Court is indeed just a part of the whole
system. For sure, one should not underestimate the role of the Court
for sure, but one should not over-estimate this role either. The Court
has to work hand-in-hand with the African Commission. The African
Commission still has a very important role to play, and it will have a
very important role to play in the future. What the Court can do and
what the Court is trying to do so far is to create what is missing now in
Africa’s judicial culture. Commissioner Bahame Nyanduga this
morning talked about the creation of a “human rights culture” within
the African continent by the political bodies of the African Union.
But what is missing is a “judicial” culture, both at the continental
level and at the grassroots, municipal level. There is no respect for
judges at the national level. Most of the African states do not really
consider the decisions or the rulings of the judges. So this is the first
challenge actually. The first challenge is to create this “judicial
culture” and together with the human rights culture, which is
underway. This is what I wanted to say in response to your question
concerning the potential role of the future merged court: do not
expect too much from both courts.
******
Andrew Drzemczewski: I have to answer you in a historical context.
Unlike the Inter-American system, the European Convention created
both the European Commission and the Court. As you know, it had
jurisdiction contingent on acceptance of its possibility of taking a case
to the court. And Protocol 11 was, at the time, negotiated for a
variety of reasons. Amongst those reasons was the fact that the
European Commission dealt with cases, admissibility hearings, and
the merits, and then it went to the Court. And the Court repeated
the same procedure. There was, to a certain extent, already a certain
competition between both organs. The length of cases was enormous
and the whole system was falling apart in the way of somebody getting
justice ten to fifteen years after having brought his or her case before
the Commission. So Protocol 11, rightly or wrongly, hopefully
rightly, brought together everything under the jurisdiction of one
single court. Within that Court we have committees of three judges
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to deal with admissibility, chambers of seven judges, and a grand
chamber of seventeen judges with a hybrid creation to accommodate
those who wanted two levels of jurisdiction (with a possibility of
relinquishment or referral from a chamber to the grand chamber).
I suspect, politically and logically, we are not going to go back on
that decision. We have moved forward to a purely judicial system.
The Group of Wise Persons have come out with the idea of having a
judicial committee within the Court which would, in effect, do what is
envisioned under Protocol 14. A single judge would deal with
patently inadmissible cases; for example, six-month rule brought
against the wrong state or a non-exhaustion of local remedies which
are obvious. A committee of three would look into manifestly wellfounded cases. Although it looks on the face of it interesting, my
understanding of discussions within the Legal Affairs Committee,
which I am trying to reflect honestly to you, is that the Legal Affairs
Committee has strong reservations as to this idea. It is very easy to
become a judge on a grand chamber dealing with 100 cases. Do we
really need forty-seven judges to deal with 100 cases a year and to deal
with constitutional cases while doing the real work of
inadmissibility—the boring, difficult grind, the daily bread and butter
work—left to the Judicial Committee? How many people here, if you
were judges of a high court or a supreme court, would be willing to
take on the role of an inferior court to do the boring work, and
anything interesting, you pass on to a higher court? There are
difficulties regarding how the system would work as it is proposed by
the Wise Persons. But, in a nutshell, this provision of having a junior
element of functioning within the present full-time single court is
79
presently on the table.
CLOSING REMARKS
A. Diane Orentlicher
I just want to do the obvious, which is to thank this extraordinarily
distinguished group of panelists for a very rich discussion. I think the
discussion all day has underscored the value of fostering this type of
exchange. It has also probably underscored the value of continuing
to do this. I was trying to remember the expression, “victim of your
own success,” that characterizes the dilemma that the European
79. For more information about the report of the Group of Wise Persons, see
Comm. Of Ministers, Interim Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee
of Ministers, 116th Sess., Doc. No. CM(2006) 88 (May 19, 2006).
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system faces. I think in some ways this conference was a victim of its
own success. We had so many fabulous speakers that it was hard to
do justice to all of the issues that they raised. So I do hope that this
will inspire further exchanges of this sort, perhaps on an institutional
basis.
I know that I have come away from this with many ideas about ways
that the organizations I am affiliated with might be able to bolster the
work. We have talked, in passing, about the importance of civil
society in making these institutions work. Any of us who have seen
these institutions work over a long period have seen how important it
is to have effective civil society demand that these institutions operate
better than they already do and take them seriously. And I think we
have seen today some new agenda items that we need to pay attention
to ourselves. I found quite sobering—in the last panel in particular—
the degree to which states are not embarrassed by their noncompliance. That is another agenda item among many that came to
my mind.
I want to end by thanking the MacArthur Foundation, the InterAmerican Court and Commission, Agustina Del Campo, the
MacArthur Foundation, and Claudio Grossman for providing the
opportunity for us to have this dialogue. I think a lot of really
valuable ideas have come out of it. So thank you.
B. Claudio Grossman
Allow me to join Diane in thanking the MacArthur Foundation, the
Inter-American Court and Commission, and Agustina Del Campo as
well as all of you who participated as panelists and attendees. Finally,
I want to extend our gratitude to Diane for creating this opportunity
for us. As you may already know, no good deed goes unpunished in
this institution. Because of the success of this program and the
nature of the problems that we confront in the human rights field, I
am sure that we will have further opportunities to exchange our views
in the future.

